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INTRODUCTION
State budgets throughout the United States have come under
unprecedented pressure. In recent years, state coffers have gone
from flush to dry, and the prevalence of balanced budget
requirements in state constitutions and statutes' has turned revenue
1. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. IX, § 5 ("The State may contract debts to supply the
casual deficits or failures in revenues ... but the aggregate amount.., shall never exceed
the sum of three hundred and fifty thousand dollars .... ); CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 1
("The Legislature shall not, in any manner create any debt or debts, liability or liabilities,
which shall, singly or in the aggregate with any previous debts or liabilities, exceed the sum
of three hundred thousand dollars ... unless the same shall be authorized by law for some
single object or work .... ); COLO. CONST. art. X, § 16 ("No appropriation shall be made,
nor any expenditure authorized by the general assembly, whereby the expenditure of the
state, during any fiscal year, shall exceed the total tax then provided for by law and
applicable for such appropriation or expenditure .. "); CONN. CONST. art. III, § 18 ("The
amount of general budget expenditures authorized for any fiscal year shall not exceed the
estimated amount of revenue for such fiscal year."); DEL. CONST. art. VIII, § 3 ("No
money shall be borrowed.., but pursuant to an Act of the General Assembly, passed with
the concurrence of three fourths of all the members elected to each [House] .. "); IDAHO
CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (stating that the "legislature shall not in any manner create any
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shortfalls into a nationwide crisis.2 A combination of rising costs of
and standards for education,3 political trends that have delegated
many governmental functions to the state level,4 and judicial opinions
echoing these political trends by reactivating states' rights doctrines5
has given state governments expansive new responsibilities in public
policy. These trends have collided with balanced budget
requirements in the several states to produce what is essentially a
systemic budget crisis.6
North Carolina is a case in point. In article V, section 3, of the
1971 North Carolina state constitution, the State is prohibited from
enacting unbalanced budgets that would require the State to borrow
on its "faith and credit."7 This balanced budget provision was also a
part of the preceding state constitution of 1868.8 As such, the case
law that has developed around the balanced budget requirement
debt.., except in case of war" without a voter referendum); IOWA CONST. art. VII, § 2
("The state may contract debts to supply casual deficits or failures in revenues, or to meet
expenses not otherwise provided for, but the aggregate amount. . . shall never exceed the
sum of two hundred and fifty thousand dollars"); MD. CONST. art. III, § 52(5a) (barring all
revenue bills and amendments for which expenditures exceed revenues from being
introduced in the legislature); ME. CONST. art. IX, § 14 (requiring all non-war debt
creation over $2 million to be submitted to a voter referendum, with some narrow
exceptions); MONT. CONST. art. VIII, § 8 ("No state debt shall be created unless
authorized by a two-thirds vote of the members of each house of the legislature or a
majority of the electors voting thereon."); N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(2) (requiring
expected revenues to equal or exceed expected expenditures for appropriations laws);
N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 11 (requiring debt creation to be submitted to a voter
referendum); TEX. CONST. art. III, § 49-j ("The maximum annual debt service in any fiscal
year on state debt ... may not exceed five percent of an amount equal to the average of
the amount of general revenue fund revenues, excluding revenues constitutionally
dedicated for purposes other than payment of state debt, for the three preceding fiscal
years."); Wis. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 6, 7 (requiring voter referendum for the creation of
debts exceeding caps based on total taxable property values); see also Donald B. Tobin,
The Balanced Budget Amendment: Will Judges Become Accountants? A Look at State
Experiences, 12 J. L. & POL. 153, 155 (1996) (reporting that forty-eight of the fifty states
have balanced budget requirements by either statute or constitutional provision).
2. IRIS J. LAV, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL'Y PRIORITIES, THE STATE FISCAL
CRISIS IS IMPEDING ECONOMIC GROWTH; FEDERAL AID TO STATES WOULD BE MOST
EFFECTIVE STIMULUS 1 (2003), at http://www.cbpp.org/2-18-03sfp.pdf (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
3. See infra Part II.A.
4. See infra Part II.A.
5. See infra Part II.B.
6. See infra Part II (detailing the argument that the state budgeting problem has
become systemic).
7. N.C. CONST. art. V, § 3(1).
8. The first two subsections of article V, section 3, are derived from article V, section
4, of the North Carolina Constitution of 1868. The fourth subsection is the progeny of
article I, section 6, of the 1868 constitution.
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extends continuously over a span of more than one hundred years,9
and the original justifications for the balanced budget are a species of
nineteenth century policymaking.'0
The changes that have occurred in North Carolina's state
government over the past century and a half are striking. Until 1868,
North Carolina had no statewide public school system with
compulsory attendance," the State received most of its tax revenues
from the property tax, 2 and social services were undertaken primarily
at the local level by churches and other non-governmental charities. 3
Moreover, the constitution was the result of a Reconstruction effort
to reconfigure the State to govern itself responsibly. Thus, the
unusual exigencies of that era suggest that, at the least, the provision
deserves reexamination in light of the fact that the State now has a
viable and stable government, in stark contrast to 1868.14
Likewise, changes in North Carolina since the adoption of the
modern balanced budget provision in 19771' have fundamentally
altered the outlook of budgetary planning. The fiscal decisions of the
last few years have been tremendously difficult, given the social
policy goals of the State, the newly-interpreted constitutional
requirement of a "sound basic education" for all school-aged
children, 6 existing obligations to current and former state employees,
and a particularly difficult recession for North Carolina. 7 The 2003
budget 18 was balanced only after closing a gap in the billion-dollar
9. See generally Hallyburton v. Bd. of Educ., 213 N.C. 9, 195 S.E. 21 (1938) (holding
that the prohibition on borrowing without a referendum "is unambiguous, plain and
direct"); Univ. R.R. Co. v. W. W. Holden, 63 N.C. 410 (1869) (holding that the State
cannot contract for debt to build a railroad without referendum).
10. See G. Alan Tarr, Interpreting the Separation of Powers in State Constitutions, 59
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. OF AM. L. 329, 335 (2003) (providing an overview of the nineteenth
century historical trends that contributed to state budgetary restrictions).
11. See STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT RELATIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA:
THEIR EVOLUTION AND CURRENT STATUS 6 (Charles D. Liner ed., 2d ed. 1995)
[hereinafter STATE AND LOCAL] (noting that the 1868 constitutional convention instituted
the constitutional provision for a "general and uniform" school system).
12. Id. at 7-8. See generally A. FLEMING BELL III & WARREN JAKE WICKER,
COUNTY GOVERNMENT IN NORTH CAROLINA 175-233 (4th ed. 1999) (detailing the
usage of the property tax).
13. See generally STEPHEN V. MONSMA, WHEN SACRED AND SECULAR MIX:
RELIGIOUS NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS AND PUBLIC MONEY 5-6 (1996) (noting that
religious charities predate the social welfare state).
14. John L. Sanders, Our Constitutions: An Historical Perspective, in 35 NORTH
CAROLINA'S CONSTITUTION 36-38 (1998).
15. See infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
16. Leandro v. State, 346 N.C. 336, 353, 488 S.E.2d 249, 258 (1997).
17. See infra Part III.C.
18. See Current Operations, Capital Improvements, and Finance Act of 2002, ch. 126,
1197
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range, using a number of stopgap fixes.' 9 After the boom years of the
1990s, in which the budget-makers enjoyed revenue windfalls and talk
of greatly increasing the states' power in the federal system,2° North
Carolina's capacity to adapt to these many changing circumstances is
plainly constrained by its self-imposed balanced budget requirement.
This Comment illustrates how a number of trends in the law,
policy preferences, and economic circumstances seriously call into
question the old justifications for a constitutionally mandated
balanced budget. These trends combine in a way that may not be
clear either to lawmakers or the public at large. To date, there are no
articles in the academic literature that analyze North Carolina's
constitutional restrictions on public debt. In fact, there is a paucity of
law review commentary on the reassessment of the state balanced
budget requirements. Thus, this Comment makes a contribution to
the literature on the contemporary budget woes of state governments.
There are a number of possible alternatives to the state's rather
strict constitutional provision. Complete repeal is probably neither
politically tenable nor fiscally desirable given the potential for
legislative abuse of such unchecked fiscal freedom.2 1 Among the
possible mechanisms that would give legislators greater flexibility
without handing them a blank check, this Comment argues that a
provision which allows the State to borrow using relatively short-term
instruments such as five or ten-year bonds without voter approval
would be a compelling compromise between fiscal restraint and
flexibility. In return for this moderate increase in financial planning
capability, the legislature accepts a strict cap on spending growth as
an amendment to the state constitution. This deal would take the
form of a single referendum that would essentially function as an
offer by the General Assembly to the state voters. If accepted and
approved, both the government and the taxpayer would get what
each wants; the legislature would receive much-needed flexibility to
manage the government,22 and the taxpayer would get a guarantee
that spending not rise uncontrollably.23 This fiscal arrangement
would, lastly, enhance the General Assembly's capability to manage
2002 N.C. Sess. Laws 291, 291 (2002). See generally Editorial, A Mess Delayed, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 22, 2002, at A30 [hereinafter, A Mess Delayed]
(referring to the budget as a "bailing wire-and-chewing gum budget").
19. See A Mess Delayed, supra note 18.
20. See infra Part III.B (discussing federalism jurisprudence by the U.S. Supreme
Court).
21. See infra notes 221-26 and accompanying text.
22. See infra Part III.D.
23. See infra Part III.D.
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government programs and therefore enhance its argument in debates
and negotiations on state-federal balances of power that the state is
the optimal level of government for implementation of policy
objectives.24
I. THE CASE IN POINT: NORTH CAROLINA AND ITS RESTRICTION
ON BORROWING
The purpose of the balanced budget provision of the North
Carolina constitution, according to Professor John V. Orth, was to
" 'effect the necessary economies' " of the state budget;15 in other
words, it mandated fiscal discipline by the General Assembly. The
provision originated in the 1868 postwar constitution.26 In that
Reconstruction-era constitution, the State was restricted in its power
to acquire any new debt until all of its existing bonds were settled.27
In 1936, after those bonds were fully paid, the voters approved a
constitutional amendment to enact a more permanent form of anti-
debt restriction. 28  This provision was incorporated into the 1971
24. See infra notes 246-49 and accompanying text.
25. John V. Orth, North Carolina Constitutional History, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1759, 1792
(1992) (quoting N.C. CONST. art. III, § 5).
26. Sanders, supra note 14, at 36-38.
27. N.C. CONST. art. V, § 4 (repealed 1971). Article V, section 4 provided:
Until the bonds of the State shall be at par, the General Assembly shall have no
power to contract any new debt or pecuniary obligation on behalf of the State,
except to supply a casual deficit, or for suppressing invasions or insurrections,
unless it shall in the same bill levy a special tax to pay the interest annually.
Id. See generally Univ. R.R. Co. v. W. W. Holden, 63 N.C. 410, 422 (1869) (holding that
casual deficits, invasions, and insurrections were "outside of the ordinary expenses of the
government" and therefore abnormal events); J.G. DE ROULHAC HAMILTON,
RECONSTRUCTION IN NORTH CAROLINA 276 (1914) (chronicling the decisions by the
1868 Constitutional Convention on financial matters).
28. Act of Apr. 29, 1935, ch. 248, § 4, 1935 N.C. Sess. Laws 270, 270 (repealed). The
new section 4 read:
The General Assembly shall have the power to contract debts and to pledge the
faith and credit of the State ... for the following purposes: To fund or refund a
valid existing debt; To borrow in anticipation of the collection of taxes due and
payable within the fiscal year to an amount not exceeding 50 percent of such
taxes; To supply a casual deficit; To suppress riots or insurrections, or to repel
invasions. For any purpose other than these enumerated, the General Assembly
shall have no power, during any biennium, to contract new debts on behalf of the
State to an amount in excess of two-thirds of the amount by which the State's
outstanding indebtedness shall have been reduced during the next preceding
biennium, unless the subject be submitted to a vote of the people of the
State .... In any election held in the State ... under the provisions of this
Section, the proposed indebtedness shall be approved by a majority of those who
shall vote thereon.
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constitution as the new article V, section 3.29 In 1977, North Carolina
voters approved the current version of the debt restriction, one that
required the governor to "effect the necessary economies in State
expenditures" to ensure an operating balanced budget3" and reformed
the language of section 3, which now reads as follows:
(1) Authorized purposes; two-thirds limitation. The General
Assembly shall have no power to contract debts secured by a
pledge of the faith and credit of the State, unless approved by a
majority of the qualified voters of the State who vote thereon,
except for the following purposes:
(a) To fund or refund a valid existing debt;
(b) to supply an unforeseen deficiency in the revenue;
(c) to borrow in anticipation of the collection of taxes
due and payable within the current fiscal year to an
amount not exceeding 50 per cent of such taxes;
(d) to suppress riots or insurrections, or to repel
invasions;
(e) to meet emergencies immediately threatening the
pubic health or safety, as conclusively determined in
writing by the Governor;
(f) for any other lawful purpose, to the extent of two-
thirds of the amount by which the State's outstanding
indebtedness shall have been reduced during the next
preceding biennium.3
The provision is an austere one as state balanced budget
requirements go.3 2 Perhaps the most rigid feature of the section is
simply the fact that it is constitutionally mandated. Unlike statutory
balanced budget requirements in some states,33 this one cannot
29. N.C. CONST. art. V, § 3; see also INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENT, CONSTITUTION OF
NORTH CAROLINA 1971, at 36 (1970); REPORT OF THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE
CONSTITUTION STUDY COMMISSION TO THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR AND THE
NORTH CAROLINA BAR ASSOCIATION 48-50 (1968).
30. N.C. CONST. art. III, § 5; see JOHN V. ORTH, THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE
CONSTITUTION 21 (1993).
31. N.C. CONST. art. V, § 3(1).
32. See infra notes 196-211.
33. See Lavinia L. Mears, Note, The Truth About the Balanced Budget Amendment, 20
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 592, 607 n.113 (1996) (cataloging statutory and constitutional
balanced budget provisions); see, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:8-b (2001) (requiring
adoption of a balanced budget, both as projected and as implemented); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 39.42.060 (West 2000) (limiting debt based on percentage of gross revenues
required for servicing state debt to seven percent).
[Vol. 821200
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change as policy needs dictate without resorting to the cumbersome
constitutional amendment process.34 Then, there is the absolute
nature of the prohibition on borrowing as a practical matter. The six
exceptions of article V, section 3, are not routinely part of budgetary
planning,35 so in general, the State must balance its budget. Bond
referenda do occur,36 but they are blunt, inflexible instruments. They
must be approved by the General Assembly in order to be placed on
the next statewide ballot,37 so as a matter of course they are
something to which the General Assembly rarely resorts.
Exception (f), for example, is not a viable option under normal
circumstances, because budget planners can use it only if in the
preceding two years they paid down some significant portion of
debt.38 Exception (c) allows the State to issue short-term debt within
the fiscal year in order to preserve the smooth functioning of the
government, but it is clearly not a useful tool when budgetary
shortfalls are of a more long-term nature.
The next section of article V applies the same principle to county
and city governments.39 Municipal corporations are creatures of the
General Assembly's incorporation powers, and their powers to
contract for debt are similarly limited: "[t]he General Assembly shall
have no power to authorize any county, city or town, special district,
or other unit of local government to contract debts secured by a
pledge of its faith and credit unless approved by a majority of the
qualified voters of the unit who vote thereon."4 By implication, the
General Assembly may not borrow money for public purposes
through the municipalities, so the prohibition on legislatively created
debt is watertight throughout state and local government.
34. See N.C. CONST. art. XIII, § 4.
35. For example, after the flood caused by Hurricane Floyd, perhaps the worst natural
disaster in North Carolina's history, a good portion of the unforeseen expenses that the
state incurred were paid for by the state's rainy day fund, not financed by debt obtained
under exception (e). See N.C. CONST. art. V, § 3(1)(e); GOVERNOR'S COMM'N TO
MODERNIZE STATE FINANCES, FINAL REPORT 13 (2002) [hereinafter COMM'N TO
MODERNIZE STATE FINANCES].
36. See Jane Stancill, Bonds Proposal Heading to Voters, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), May 19, 2000, at B1. The school bond referendum was a significant
commitment, and it is telling that contracting for debt would be achieved by appeal to
education, a policy priority in the state. See Dan Kane, Easley: Schools Get Break on
Cuts, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 22, 2002, at Al.
37. See sources cited supra note 36.
38. N.C. CONST. art. V, § 3(1)(f).
39. Id. art. V, § 4.
40. N.C. CONST. art. V, § 4(2). Municipalities can invoke the same exceptions that
the State can invoke under section 3(1). See id.
1201
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Thus, the budget crises of state and local governments are
interconnected in a way that those of the federal and state
governments are not.41 Further, North Carolina funds a major
portion of local governmental activities through state grants to
municipalities.42 Although withholding monies from state coffers
promised to the localities is an extreme measure, it became an
important method by which the State balanced its own budget in
fiscal year 2002, much to the chagrin of the hapless municipalities.43
Withholding $330 million that was to go to local governments' went a
long way towards recovering the nearly $1 billion budget shortfall,
but it was a bitter pill to swallow for the municipalities that depended
on the money.45
II. UNSUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW AND POLITICS
One of the chief contentions of this Comment is that a number of
seemingly independent trends have combined to create the recent
fiscal gaps and that these trends do not appear to be receding. The
nature of state and local government is radically different from 1868,
when the original balanced budget requirement was formally debated
at the postwar constitutional convention.46  State and local
41. See HOWARD CHERNICK & ANDREW RECHOVSKY, LOST IN THE BALANCE:
How STATE POLICIES AFFECT THE FISCAL HEALTH OF CITIES 3, 5-6 (2001), at
http://www.brookings.edu/es/urban/chernick/chernick.pdf (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review); DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A
FEDERAL SYSTEM 239-48 (5th ed. 2002).
42. STATE AND LOCAL, supra note 11, at 10-14.
43. Dan Kane, $2 Billion, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 26, 2003, at A19;
see also David Rice, Money Was Off-Limits, Attorneys Say, WINSTON-SALEM J., Dec. 18,
2003, at B1 (reporting on a trial hearing in a lawsuit by counties to recover withheld
funds); David Rice, State Is Backing Out on Promise, Mayor Says, WINSTON-SALEM J.,
Mar. 6, 2003, at Al [hereinafter Rice, State Is Backing Out] (reporting on additional
payment withholdings proposals in budget negotiations and lobbying efforts to prevent the
measures).
44. Rice, State Is Backing Out, supra note 43.
45. See, e.g., Carey Hamilton, Some Say Tax Plan Is Uneven; Counties, Cities Once
Dependent on Tobacco Would Be Hardest Hit, WINSTON-SALEM J., July 29, 2002, at B1
(detailing the fiscal impact of the proposed tax plan on affected cities). But see MICHAEL
LOWREY & ERIK ROOT, BY THE NUMBERS 2003, at 3-4 (2003) (asserting that current
revenue sources for municipalities are not inadequate despite withholding by the state), at
http://www.johnlocke.org/acrobat/homePageFeatures/local-taxreport_2003.pdf (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review).
46. See generally JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE
OF NORTH-CAROLINA, AT ITS SESSION 1868 (Joseph W. Holden ed., 1868) (chronicling
the proceedings of the 1868 state constitutional convention). In the postwar constitutional
convention, there was substantial concern over the deterioration of North Carolina's
financial position. See Record of the 1868 Constitutional Convention 756-64 (compiled
1971) (unpublished record of the proceedings of the 1868 North Carolina constitutional
1202 [Vol. 82
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governments are also substantially different than they were at the
time of the ratification of the new constitution in 1971," 7 and the
budgetary realities and policy trends of recent years have continued
to change the fiscal playing field in ways that might not have even
been envisioned in the mid-1990s, when North Carolina and other
states had not yet faced the financial difficulties of recent years.48
convention compiled by Joseph Ferrell, University of North Carolina J. Albert Coates
Professor of Public Law and Government) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
General J.C. Abbott, reporting on behalf of the Committee on Finance, see id. at 750,
stated, "[North Carolina's] honor and credit, once the very highest of any Southern State,
is now the lowest, and this results not from any necessity, but from neglect and failure to
act in the line of her true policy and true interest." Id. at 760. In his speech to the
convention, he regarded this issue to be one of the chief needs of the state in this critical
time in its history:
Mr. President, this is no fancy sketch, no mere flight of the imagination. All this
can be done, and done speedily. The dark pall that once rested upon the State
like the miasma of death is now lifted forever, and it remains for us to accomplish
the rest. Adopt a sound financial policy, a liberal Constitution and a wisely
administered government, and the work is accomplished. Let us then open our
doors. Let us take away the only remaining obstruction. Let us restore to the
good old State her ancient fair fame, her honor, her credit, her time-honored
name for honesty and integrity. Do this and the most enthusiastic among us does
not dream of what is in store for North Carolina.
Id. at 762.
The postwar debt load, according to Abbott, had been neglected and was
hampering the return of the state to fiscal normalcy. Id. at 760. He therefore proposed
that North Carolina follow the lead of Missouri, also a slave state, and resolve to make
debt repayment a priority of the new government. Id. at 760-62. His proposal, therefore,
called for a constitutional requirement that the State not contract any more debt until the
existing bonds were at par. Id. at 750. His proposed additional provision allowed for a
lending of state credit only upon the passage of a voter referendum. Id. The convention
debated the practicality of repaying the debt at that time, given the dire fiscal straits of the
state at the time and the proposed system for taxation. Id. at 770-72. However, Abbott's
proposal, which included a companion constitutional provision requiring repayment of the
debt, was ratified by the convention. Id. at 772. These were codified in the North
Carolina Constitution of 1868 in article V, sections 4 and 5. In this respect, the debates
reveal that the overriding problem that gave rise to this approach to state finance was the
fiscal disaster that the North Carolina faced in the aftermath of the Civil War. See
generally NORTH CAROLINA STANDARD (Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 11, 1868, at 2-3 (reporting
on the business conducted at the convention and printing the major speeches that were
given).
47. See COMM'N TO MODERNIZE STATE FINANCES, supra note 35, at 3.
48. See, e.g., NATIONAL ASS'N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, BUDGET SHORTFALLS:
STRATEGIES FOR CLOSING SPENDING AND REVENUE GAPS 1 (2002) [hereinafter
BUDGET SHORTFALLS] (summarizing some of the 2002-03 state budgetary shortfalls and
remedies that states adopted), at http://www.nasbo.org/Publications/PDFs/
shortfallstrategies-3rd.pdf. (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). See generally
Susan P. Fino, De Tocqueville or Disney? The Rehnquist Court's Idea of Federalism, 66
ALB. L. REV. 765 (2003) (discussing the recent fiscal crisis for states as a result of taxing
limits and spending mandates); Lawrence 0. Gostin, When Terrorism Threatens Health:
How Far Are Limitations on Personal and Economic Liberties Justified?, 55 FLA. L. REV.
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There are essentially three types of trends that have produced these
changed circumstances: changes in government policy, judicial trends
in constitutional jurisprudence, and new economic realities.
A. Governmental Policy Decisions
1. State Budget
Any overarching discussion of the state budget in North Carolina
begins with education, which is by far its largest appropriations
category. Education constituted fifty-six percent of the state budget
in 2002-03, 49 the vast majority of which was for primary and
secondary school education." Overall, state citizens enjoy a relatively
low total tax burden,51 and public instruction is funded almost entirely
by the state budget and not local budgets, in contrast to many other
states.
A number of policy initiatives in the 1990s charted a new course
for public education in North Carolina. During these years Governor
Jim Hunt made the public school system a priority,53 leading to
numerous new programs. Among them were Smart Start,54 a state-
1105 (2003) (referring to the difficulty of preparing for the terrorist threat in a climate of
state budgetary crisis); see also LAy, supra note 2, at 1-2 (describing the fiscal crisis, the
states' response to it, and its effect on the nationwide economy).
49. Total expenditures were $14.78 billion, and the State spent $8.36 billion on
education during that period. See Current Operations and Capital Improvements
Appropriations Act of 2001, ch. 424, pt. I, § 2.1, 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 1670, 1671-72
(2001).
50. See id. (allocating to the Department of Public Instruction $5.9 billion of the $8.36
billion total education expenditures).
51. In total tax burdens, North Carolina ranked thirty-fifth out of the fifty states in
2002. TAX FOUNDATION, SPECIAL REPORT: AMERICA CELEBRATES TAX FREEDOM
DAY 9 (April 2002), at http://www.taxfoundation.org/images/srll2.pdf (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
52. STATE AND LOCAL, supra note 11, at 11. In the early 1930s, the State took over
financing public education, road construction, and prison administration and construction.
Id.
53. See Todd Silberman, Education Chief Gives Nod to N.C., NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 6, 2000, at B3 (reporting that U.S. Education Secretary Richard
Riley's visit to the state honored the accomplishments of the Hunt administration in the
area of education). Secretary Riley said of Governor Hunt's efforts:
"North Carolina, under Gov. Hunt, has become a national leader in improving
education," Riley said in a written statement. "Gov. Hunt has worked tirelessly
to improve teacher quality, raise standards, expand early childhood education,
give children the learning power of technology and support improvements in
public education. When a governor like Jim Hunt makes education a top
priority, it makes all the difference to our children-and our nation."
Id. (quoting Richard Riley, U.S. Secretary of Education).
54. Amy Gardner, A Farewell Flourish, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 23,
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level version of the federal government's Head Start program for
early childhood educational development, initiatives designed to
track student progress more effectively, 55 and an ambitious program
to elevate teaching standards by raising teacher pay and weeding out
underachieving teachers. 6  The results have been impressive. In
terms of teacher training, North Carolina rose from having only eight
teachers receiving certification by the National Board of Professional
Teaching standards in 1994 to leading the nation in certification as of
2000-01.17 Teacher pay has risen from low levels to approximately
the national average,58  and SAT scores have seen significant
improvement. 9 Higher standards have come at a cost, however, as
the public school budget for the state has risen twenty-four percent
from the 1997-98 school year to the 2002-03 school year.'
Criminal justice initiatives of the 1990s were another significant
legislative priority that increased the state's long-term financial
obligations. Structured sentencing legislation,61 including the "three-
strikes-and-you're-in" provision for habitual felons, was also
2000, at Al.
55. See id.
56. Id.; see also NORTH CAROLINA DEPT. OF EDUC., STAYING THE COURSE FOR
SUPERIOR SCHOOLS: 2000-2001 ANNUAL REPORT 12-13 (2001) [hereinafter STAYING
THE COURSE] (reporting on the progress made in improving overall teacher quality),
available at http://www.ncpublicschools.org/state-board/annualrpt/00-01l/ (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
57. Id. at 13. But see GEORGE C. LEEF, NATIONAL BOARD CERTIFICATION: IS
NORTH CAROLINA GETTING ITS MONEY'S WORTH? 2-10 (North Carolina Education
Alliance, 2003) (critiquing board certification initiatives in North Carolina as being a
waste of money and ideologically biased), at http:l/www.johnlocke.org/acrobat/
policyReports/leefcertification2.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Law Review);
KAREN PALASEK, GRADING OUR SCHOOLS 2002: NCEA'S FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT TO
NORTH CAROLINA TAXPAYERS AND PARENTS 2-3 (2002) (criticizing state education
assessment measures as confusing), at http://www.johnlocke.orglacrobat/policyReports/
gos_2002-web.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
58. See STAYING THE COURSE, supra note 56, at 12-13.
59. See id. at 6; PALASEK, supra note 57, at 7 (providing district-specific assessments
of public school improvements); Gardner, supra note 54. Palasek contends that SAT
performance is not impressive and remains sub par. PALASEK, supra note 57, at 7.
60. Compare Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of
1997, ch. 443, pt. II, § 2, 1997 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1344, 1345 (allocating public schools
$4,510,318,741 for 1997-98), with Current Operations and Capital Improvements
Appropriations Act of 2001, ch. 424, pt. I, § 2.1, 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 1670, 1671
(allocating public schools $5,922,188,546 for 2002-03). The amount allocated for the 2002-
03 budget is twenty-four percent higher than the amount allocated for 1997-98. But see
COMM'N TO MODERNIZE STATE FINANCES, supra note 35, at 19 (noting that enrollment
increases accounted for part of the increase in education funding from 1999 to 2000, along
with increased teacher compensation and higher spending on education programs).
61. Id.; see Structured Sentencing Act, ch. 538, 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws 2298, 2298
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-1340.10 to 1340.23 (2001)).
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supported by Governor Hunt.62 Passed in a special session of the
General Assembly to deal with crime in 1994, the "three strikes"
statute requires that persons convicted of three violent felonies be
given life prison sentences without parole eligibility. 63  These
structured sentencing initiatives also imposed more formal
requirements on trial courts by specifying mandatory minimum prison
terms.' Whether or not these laws were good policy, 65 they certainly
had the effect of burgeoning prison populations in the state, thereby
imposing continuing expenditures on future state budgets to maintain
this population.66 The fiscal impact of burgeoning prison populations
is long-term and inflexible, given that prison construction as well as
inmate incarceration compel the State to enter into large prison
construction and management contracts. 67  Thus, these budgetary
items are not generally discretionary spending that can easily be
dropped in times of financial hardship.
62. Gardner, supra note 54 (noting Governor Hunt's support for the "three strikes"
legislation); see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-7.12 (2001) (mandating life without parole for
violent habitual felons who are convicted of a third violent felony); see also N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-7.7 (2001) (defining "violent habitual felon").
63. See § 14-7.12.
64. See Structured Sentencing Act, ch. 538, sec. 1, 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws 2298, 2307-11
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-1340.10 to 1340.23 (2001)). An example of the
structured sentencing initiative can be found at section 15A-1340.17(c), which established
the sentencing requirements for a given class of crime and the convict's prior criminal
record.
65. See RONALD F. WRIGHT, MANAGING PRISON GROWTH IN NORTH CAROLINA
THROUGH STRUCTURED SENTENCING 13 (1998); Walter L. Gordon III, California's
Three Strikes Law: Tyranny of the Majority, 20 WHITTIER L. REV. 577 passim (1999)
(attacking California's approach from an array of angles, including political self-interest of
bill sponsors and the ineffectiveness and racially unequal effects of the law); Meredith
McClain, Note, "Three Strikes and You're Out": The Solution to the Repeat Offender
Problem?, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 97, 124-26 (1996) (expressing skepticism that three
strikes legislation around the country would impact crime rates or attack the root causes of
crime).
66. See WRIGHT, supra note 65, at 8-9 (describing the projected cost and
incarceration rate increases as a result of structured sentencing bills); Kane, supra note 43
(noting that the burgeoning prison population required the construction of three new
prisons at a cost of $60 million). The total Department of Corrections budget for 2001
reached $923 million, or over six percent of the total state budget. See Current Operations
and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2001, ch. 424, pt. I, § 2.1, 2001 N.C. Sess.
Laws 1670, 1673.
67. STATEWIDE ACCOUNTING DiV., OFFICE OF THE STATE CONTROLLER, NORTH
CAROLINA COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR
ENDED JUNE 30, 2002, at 124 (2002) [hereinafter 2002 CAFR] (summarizing the long-term
prison construction contracts that North Carolina entered into during the fiscal year 2002
and noting North Carolina's contract for a twenty-year prison lease estimated to cost $370
million), available at http://www.osc.state.nc.us/financial/02_cafr/2002_CAFR.pdf (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review).
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2. Federal Legislation
Federal policy choices in recent years have also impacted state
budgets in significant ways. Perhaps foremost, the North American
Free Trade Agreement of 199468 ("NAFTA") impacted North
Carolina's revenue stream directly by lowering the state's gross
economic output. NAFTA affected manufacturing in the state by
facilitating the relocation of facilities to Mexico. 9 Because of the
sheer size of the manufacturing industry, North Carolina suffered
more job losses than any other state as a result of the free trade
policies of the 1990s and the first few years of the twenty-first
century.0 So, while the state's consumers certainly benefited from
lower product prices, which might give them more net purchasing
power as a group,"l the overall effect on state revenues was likely a
decrease in tax revenues. This decrease resulted because the state's
individual and corporate income tax, which is more directly impacted
by plant closings, constitutes a substantially larger percentage of state
68. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289. See
generally North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1993, Pub. L.
No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.) (approving the
treaty by enacting legislation necessary to implement it).
69. James R. Giermanski & Peter Lodge, An Analysis of NAFTA and Textile Closings
in North Carolina, 2 J. TEXTILE & APPAREL, TECH. & MGMT. 1, 1-4 (2002) (analyzing
the impact of NAFTA and competition from Mexico and Canada on plant closings), at
http://www.tx.ncsu.edu/jtatm/volume2issue3/articles/Giermanski/Giermanski -full.pdf (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review). This study documents that fifteen percent of
North Carolina firms that closed in the seven years following NAFTA ratification
reported that NAFTA was the reason for their closing. Id. at 4; see also JOBS WITH
JUSTICE & CITIZEN'S TRADE CAMPAIGN, NAFTA'S IMPACT ON NORTH CAROLINA:
JOB LOSS HAS LED TO DOWNWARD PRESSURE ON WAGES AND LIVING STANDARDS 4-
14 (2001) (detailing the plant relocations from North Carolina to Mexico and elsewhere in
an advocacy group's policy paper), available at http://www.jwj.org/globalFTAA01/NC.pdf;
STATEWIDE ACCOUNTING DIV., OFFICE OF THE STATE CONTROLLER, NORTH
CAROLINA COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR
ENDED JUNE 30, 2000, at 9 (2000) [hereinafter 2000 CAFRi (citing manufacturing job
losses as a growing problem for the economy and state budget), available at
http://www.osc.state.nc.us/financial/00 cafr/00CAFR.pdf (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review). See generally Janet Patricia Farmer, Comment, NAFTA and the Textile and
Apparel Industries: "Made in North America", 19 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 293
(1994) (overviewing the economic forces at work in the textile industries under NAFTA).
70. Amy Gardner, Layoffs Prime Election Issue, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),
Oct. 27, 2002, at Al ("North Carolina has lost more jobs to Latin America and Asia than
any other state in the nation."). But see Governor James B. Hunt, Jr., Governor's Mission
to Latin America, August 16-28, 1999, 25 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 519, 520-21 (2000)
(providing an overview of the export benefits of NAFTA to the North Carolina economy
in an article authored by the sitting governor).
71. See Hunter R. Clark & Amanda Velazquez, Foreign Direct Investment in Latin
America: Nicaragua-A Case Study, 16 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 743, 756-57 (2001)
(describing consumers' economic gains under a free trade regime).
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tax revenues than the sales tax, which would benefit from increased
sales.72 Nevertheless, the free trade sentiments of many state
politicians, even in a severely affected state like North Carolina,
prevailed in the policy debate,73 leading to the passage of supporting
legislation74 and treaty ratification.75 The pace of manufacturing
facilities moving overseas has more recently begun to pinch the state
as a whole, exacerbating what was already a stubborn recession.76
NAFTA's unemployment effects also indirectly impacted the
state budget indirectly through increased outlays relating to
unemployment benefits. The state's Unemployment Insurance
Fund,77 funded primarily through employer taxes and secondarily
through federal grants,78 declined from a balance of $1.75 billion in
199779 to $793 million in 2002.80 The impact of foreign competition on
the state budget is significant for two reasons. First, it demonstrates
how much recessions can increase state budgetary outlays if the State
72. See 2002 CAFR, supra note 67, at 32 (reporting that individual and corporate
income tax revenues for the fiscal year ending on June 30, 2002, totaled $7.8 billion,
whereas sales tax revenues were $3.8 billion). Total income tax revenues funded thirty
percent of this budget, as opposed to the sales tax revenues, which funded only fourteen
percent. Id. at 33. Precisely analyzing the net effect of NAFT'A on tax revenues would
require accounting for the increased income taxes paid by retailers who import products at
lower prices, as well as the decrease in sales taxes due to the lower consumption by those
who have suffered an income loss due to plant closings. Without delving into a
comprehensive econometric analysis, the substantial income losses due to plant closings,
see supra notes 69-70, are probably much larger than the incremental gains in sales tax
revenues caused by lower prices for consumable goods. In fact, there is strong evidence
that sales tax receipts are particularly vulnerable to economic downturns in North
Carolina. COMM'N TO MODERNIZE STATE FINANCES, supra note 35, at 5, 10. In other
words, the income effect resulting from lower wages dominates the substitution effect
benefits of lower prices.
73. See Clark & Velazquez, supra note 71, at 756-57.
74. North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-
182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993) (codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
75. 19 U.S.C. § 3311(a) (2000). See generally North American Free Trade Agreement,
Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 289 (lowering barriers to international trade in
North America).
76. See supra note 72.
77. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-6 (2001).
78. See 2000 CAFR, supra note 69, at 150 (reporting $117 million in taxes receivable
and $1.3 million in "intergovernmental receivables").
79. STATEWIDE ACCOUNTING Div., OFFICE OF THE STATE CONTROLLER, NORTH
CAROLINA COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR
ENDED JUNE 30, 1997, at 136 (1997), available at http://www.osc.state.nc.us./pdfs/97-cafr/
97CAFR.PDF.
80. 2002 CAFR, supra note 67, at 56. Much of the decline came during the
manufacturing recession of 2000-02. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text
(analyzing the economic forces that accompanied the manufacturing downturn in 2000-
2002). The fund reported assets of $1.71 billion in 2000. 2000 CAFR, supra note 69, at
150.
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has decided to undertake increased responsibility for job losses under
a free trade regime and a globalized economy.81 The economic
rationale for this correlation is that "[s]ocieties seem to demand (and
receive) an expanded government role as the price for accepting
larger doses of external risk,"82 risk which comes from increased
volatility and competition under free trade. 3
The second reason why free trade agreements such as NAFTA
and the World Trade Organizations' ("WTO") create a systemic
change to the state budget is the economic concept commonly
referred to as the "compensation principle."85  The compensation
principle states that, while winners-here, consumers-gain more
under free trade than losers-here, manufacturing workers-all will
be better off if the winners compensate the losers for their loss.
86
81. See Dani Rodrick, Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?,
106 J. POL. ECON. 997, 997-1006 (1998) (modeling the incentive structure for governments
to expand fiscal responsibilities under a free trade regime, with empirical evidence for the
theory).
82. Id. at 998.
83. See id.
84. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-Multilateral Trade Negotations
(The Uruguay Round): Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 [hereinafter WTO
agreement] (embodying the WTO Agreement and its attendant instruments). The World
Trade Organization constitutes a forum for adjudicating trade disputes under its
accompanying treaties and is committed to trade liberalization. WTO Agreement, paras.
1-7.
85. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 114 (3d ed. 2000)
(defining the compensation principle). Professor Stiglitz defines the compensation
principle for public policy decisions generally. Id.; see also RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.2, at 14-16 (6th ed. 2003) (defining the principle of
compensation using the economic concepts of Pareto efficiency and Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency).
86. In the context of the decision to choose a policy of free trade, the compensation
principle implies that, while aggregate economic gains always exceed losses when lowering
trade barriers, there may be winners and losers after free trade. If winners compensate
losers for their loss, the losers will not be made worse off, while the winners are made
better off. Generally, however, compensation will occur via government spending, given
that government is the least cost avoider; in other words, it is easier for the government to
enact a general welfare program, such as unemployment insurance and worker retraining,
than for individual winners to find individual losers and compensate them through private
transactions. Further, because the government makes the choice to make free trade
agreements, the government is the logical entity to carry out the compensation system,
such that the legislature can enact both the free trade agreement and the domestic
compensation system simultaneously. See Alia Adseri & Caries Boix, Trade, Democracy,
and the Size of the Public Sector: The Political Underpinnings of Openness, 56 INT'L ORG.
229, 229-31 (2002) (outlining the theory of how free trade decisions and public sector
expansion occur in tandem); Rodrick, supra note 81, at 1028-29. See generally Willem
Thorbecke & Christian Eigen-Zucchi, Did NAFTA Cause a "Giant Sucking Sound"?, 23 J.
LAB. RES. 647 (2002) (analyzing the net impact of NAFTA on trade and aggregate U.S.
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Because the government makes the decision to sign free trade
agreements, the typical way in which the winners bargain with the
losers is through the political process.87  Government will also,
generally, be the least cost avoider in a compensation scheme; in
other words, projects such as unemployment insurance and worker
retraining are funded by the winners through taxation, and
government is the least expensive mechanism by which to carry out
the compensation.88 In that respect, a global and liberalized economy
depends on an expanded and responsive public sector, because in the
absence of compensation, those that would lose under a free trade
regime would obstruct the ratification of free trade agreements such
as NAFTA and the WTO. North Carolina has accepted expanded
governmental responsibility, responsibility that is at its highest when
the economy is at its lowest ebb in the business cycle, as the price for
the benefits of free trade.89 The difficult irony, of course, is that state
revenues are depressed 90 when the need for spending is most
immediate.
Lastly, the United States Congress has enacted legislation
changing the balance of federalism in recent years. The Welfare
Reform Act of 19969' was perhaps the most public of a number of
national initiatives to return policy control to the state level.92 The
Act, along with others like the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act,93
were flagship bills in the effort to reinvigorate the politics of
decentralization in policy matters.94 While the Unfunded Mandates
economic welfare).
87. See AdserA & Boix, supra note 86, at 229-30.
88. See id.
89. See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text (explaining the cost of economic
downturns to the unemployment assistance program).
90. See COMM'N TO MODERNIZE STATE FINANCES, supra note 35, at 5, 10.
91. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (Aug. 22, 1996) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C).
92. See ROBERT F. NAGEL, THE IMPLOSION OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 71 (2001)
(including the Act among a number of setbacks to the nationalist interests). See generally
Sheryll D. Cashin, Federalism, Welfare Reform, and the Minority Poor: Accounting for the
Tyranny of State Majorities, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 552 (1999) (discussing in critical terms the
Welfare Reform Act, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act, and other recent decentralization initiatives).
93. Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
2 U.S.C.); see NAGEL, supra note 92, at 71; Recent Legislation, Federalism-
Intergovernmental Relations-Congress Requires a Separate, Recorded Vote for Any
Provision Establishing an Unfunded Mandate-Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995,
Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1469, 1469-74 (1996) (analyzing the
new legislative rules on unfunded federal mandates).
94. See Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress
Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1003-04
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Reform Act, which applies to all new federal regulatory actions that
apply to the states,95 largely purports to reduce the budgetary
pressures on the states coming from unfunded mandates,96 its
symbolic importance as guarantor of state sovereignty under a
reinvigorated process federalism97 merits its inclusion in this
discussion.
Further, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act also includes
requirements that federal laws state explicitly when state laws are
preempted,98 thus enacting a prophylactic against implied preemption
and shifting the burden to parties asserting preemption to prove that
a federal law supersedes state law. Thus, the Act maintains the
integrity of the state regulatory frameworks in addition to bolstering
their budgetary autonomy. Regulatory preemption was also the focus
of disputes over several Clinton administration Executive Orders.99
In particular, Executive Order 13,083 in 199800 implied an expansion
of federal regulatory authority 1°1 and suggested that the burden to
disprove preemption or to demonstrate the merits of a state waiver
from regulations rested with the state. 1°2  After state and local
(1995) (describing the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act as a federal response to the
problems of state compliance with federal mandates); Elizabeth Garrett, Enhancing the
Political Safeguards of Federalism? The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 45 U.
KAN. L. REV. 1113, 1136-37 (1997) (discussing the purposes of the Act in relation to
federalism concerns). See generally Steven P. Croley & William F. Funk, The Federal
Advisory Committee Act and Good Government, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 451, 465-66 (1997)
(noting the symbolic importance of the Unfunded Mandates Act in shifting the policy
focus toward greater regulatory flexibility at the state level).
95. 2 U.S.C. § 1531 (2000).
96. See id. § 1501(2); see also CONTRACT WITH AMERICA 125 (Ed Gillespie & Bob
Schellhas eds., 1994) (criticizing unfunded mandates).
97. "Process federalism" refers to the legal principle "that the states must look
primarily to the political process for protection from unwanted federal intrusions on their
sovereignty." John E. Taylor, Note, AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd.: The Supreme Court
Recognizes Broad FCC Jurisdiction over Local Telephone Competition, 78 N.C. L. REV.
1645, 1693 (2000). But see William Marshall, American Political Culture and the Failures
of Process Federalism, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 139, 141-44 (1998) (arguing that
process federalism did not fully take hold in the Republican Congress).
98. See Unfunded Mandates Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, § 423(e), 109 Stat. 48
(codified at 2 U.S.C. § 658b(e)). The Act requires that "the committee report
accompanying the bill or joint resolution shall contain, if relevant to the bill or joint
resolution, an explicit statement on the extent to which the bill or joint resolution is
intended to preempt any State, local or tribal law, and, if so, an explanation of the effect of
such preemption." Id.
99. See Jennie Holman Blake, Comment, Presidential Power Grab or Pure State
Might? A Modern Debate Over Executive Interpretations on Federalism, 2000 BYU L.
REV. 293, 293-94 (2000).
100. Exec. Order No. 13,083,3 C.F.R. 146 (1998).
101. See id. at § 3(d).
102. See id. at § 5; Blake, supra note 99, at 300-01.
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governments complained about this change in policy, President
Clinton suspended the Order 13 and later replaced it with a new
Executive Order 10 4 that restored the regime of deference to the states
that had been federal executive policy since the Reagan
administration. 5 Thus, proponents of state autonomy have been
successful not only by lobbying the U.S. Congress, but also through
lobbying of the federal executive branch by state and local
governments.
Academic responses to this "new federalism"1 6 have been
mixed," 7 but the elections of 2000 and 2002 placed the national
government squarely in the hands of the Republican Party, a party
that generally favors decentralized control of regulatory matters and
social policy. 108 While there are important reasons why the federal
government's power may be expected to increase in some areas,
103. Exec. Order No. 13,095, 3 C.F.R. 202 (1998).
104. Exec. Order No. 13,132, 3 C.F.R. 206 (1999), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C.
§ 601 (2000).
105. Blake, supra note 99, at 295.
106. See generally Cynthia A. Baker & Jonathan D. Mattingly, Symposium, National
Power and State Autonomy: Calibrating the New "New Federalism," 32 IND. L. REV. 1
(1998) (introducing a symposium issue on "New Federalism").
107. Many authors have made arguments in favor of greater state responsibility over
policy issues. See, e.g., John D. Blum, Overcoming Managed Care Regulatory Chaos
Through a Restructured Federalism, 11 HEALTH MATRIX 327, 339-44 (2001) (calling for
greater state control in some areas of health care policy while favoring federal control over
other areas); Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public
Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 555-59 (2001) (criticizing the public choice
justification for federal regulation in environmental policy and suggesting that state-level
regulation may be more responsive to environmental concerns than federal-level
regulations). For commentary critical of trends towards expanded federalism, see Daniel
H. Cole & Carol S. Comer, Rhetoric, Reality, and the Law of Unfunded Federal Mandates,
8 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 103, 110 (1997) (arguing that state and local governments have
largely based their complaints about unfunded mandates on myths about their costs,
though reserving judgment about the ultimate wisdom of the Unfunded Mandates Reform
Act); Tracy A. Kaye, Show Me the Money: Congressional Limitations on State Tax
Authority, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 149, 150-60 (1998) (criticizing "devolution" as
inadequately taking into account the disparities in state resources for dealing with policy
problems); Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144
U. PA. L. REV. 2341, 2414-15 (1996) (arguing for revised and more effective federal
regulatory approaches to the problem of interstate environmental externalities). See
generally DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE (1995) (providing an
extended discussion of the ongoing policy debates between proponents of national control
and state control, albeit before the 1996 acts were passed).
108. See David J. Kennedy, Due Process in a Privatized Welfare System, 64 BROOK. L.
REV. 231, 253-54 (1998); CONTRACT WITH AMERICA, supra note 96, at 125. But see infra
notes 111-18 and accompanying text (discussing recent legislation sponsored by the
Republican Party and passed by Congress that broadened federal regulation of corporate
governance and set national standards for education).
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especially those of international concern, 109 there are areas of policy
in which proponents of state action have prevailed since 1996 and in
which they may continue to influence political debates."0
Notably, however, the Republican Party has become increasingly
willing to enact federal laws that preempt state laws, as the Party's
control over federal legislation has increased, even in areas of
traditional state authority such as education. For example, the No
Child Left Behind Act of 2001111 gives the U.S. Department of
Education broad new authority over quality controls in state
education policy.112 In addition, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 200211
creates expansive federal restrictions on executive compensation and
furthers existing federal regulatory controls over corporate
governance.' 4  Like the No Child Left Behind Act, the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act enacts a single, inflexible federal standard" 5 that may have
been ineffectively drafted and, partly as a result, overbroad. 6 The
109. See Barry Friedman, Symposium, The Law and Economics of Federalism: Valuing
Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 369-70 (1997) (noting that the doctrinal changes mirror
what is happening in the nation and the world at large).
110. See id. at 368 (noting recent devolution trends). In a classic article on federalism,
Professor Herbert Wechsler argues that the legislative process creates important
safeguards for federalism concerns and that the concentrated focus of the academic legal
community on the U.S. Supreme Court tends to deemphasize the legislative role in the
defense of federalism. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The
Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54
COLUM. L. REV. 543, 543-44 (1954). The decentralization-inclined legislation of the
1990s, reinvigorating the interests of the states in matters of local policy, would appear to
support his claim. Some Supreme Court Justices expressed support for Professor
Wechsler's theory. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 565 n.9
(1985) (Powell, J., dissenting). It appears, however, that the current Court has faith in
process federalism in light of current decisions. See infra notes 136-42 and accompanying
text. See generally Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485,
1528 (1994) (arguing that party politics is a key instigator of process federalism, though
refuting Wechsler's explanations in the article). But see Marshall, supra note 97, at 147-49
(questioning the validity of Professor Wechsler's predictions).
111. Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
20 U.S.C.).
112. See Scott F. Johnson, Reexamining Rowley: A New Focus in Special Education
Law, 2003 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 561, 574-75.
113. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).
114. See Kathryn Stewart Lehman, Recent Development, Executive Compensation
Following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 81 N.C. L. REV. 2115, 2117-18 (2003)
(illustrating the legislative intent of the Act contrasted against its shortfalls).
115. E. Norman Veasey, State-Federal Tension in Corporate Governance and the
Professional Responsibilities of Advisors, 28 IOWA J. CORP. L. 441, 443-44 (2003)
(referring to the act as a one-size-fits-all policy that threatens to deter qualified directors,
thus further exposing investors).
116. Lehman, supra note 114, at 2117-18 (critiquing the legislation as overbroad and
ineffectively drafted); see also id. at 2121-31 (detailing ambiguities in the statute regarding
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fact that the legislation received overwhelmingly bipartisan support117
reinforces the notion that, even for members of Congress who
espouse federalism in theory, the power of the Supremacy Clause is
an alluring siren.' Nevertheless, while federal control over policy
priorities is hardly a dead letter,"9 decentralization continues to be a
popular governing philosophy12 for a party that is currently in control
of Congress, the presidency, and a majority of the governor's
mansions.121  The increase in responsibility at the state level of
government, therefore, adds to the need for flexibility in the state's
system of finance. Regardless of what the optimal level of taxation is
for the state and federal levels of government, with responsibility
over policy objectives comes a need for budgetary options capable of
meeting those objectives. 122  Even if one argues that the tax level
should not change, such that more discretionary programs should be
cut to fund the more long-term and constant programs cited above,
the enhanced need for flexibility remains. In fact, because economic
director and executive compensation restrictions).
117. Id. at 2120.
118. See Marshall, supra note 97, at 141-44 (noting what legislation federalism
proponents supported that did and did not resonate with the principles of federalism).
Professor Marshall asserts that the support an item of federal legislation receives is
generally dependent on its policy substance, not on whether its implementation will occur
at the appropriate level of government. Id. at 144.
119. See Bush Priorities Stay Jammed in Congress, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 2003, at F2
(reporting that a Republican-sponsored bill to require most class actions to be filed in
federal court failed by a single vote in the U.S. Senate); Jan Crawford Greenberg, GOP
Renews Attack on Malpractice Awards: Republicans Seeking Limits on Medical
Malpractice Judgments See Tort Reform as Potent Political Weapon for the 2004 Campaign,
CHI. TRIB., Sept. 19, 2003, § 1, at 1 (reporting that the Republican Party remains
committed to federal medical malpractice damage caps).
120. See Carl Hulse, Passage Unlikely for Separate Bill on Electrical Grid, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 19, 2003, at Al (reporting that the Republican Party favors market-based solutions
that do not preempt state laws in the area of electricity regulation); Michael Janofsky,
U.S.-Utah Land Accord Incites Unlikely Critics, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2003, at A18
(reporting on Republican-led initiatives to provide for greater local control over federal
lands); Bob Kemper, Partisan Clash in Congress Clouds Head Start's Future: Bush,
Democrats in Bitter Impasse, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 30, 2003, § 1, at 15 (reporting on the
Republican Party's effort to give states greater control over Head Start).
121. Brooke Donald, GOP Showed National Gains, Controlling Congress,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Dec. 29, 2002, at 2J; Melanie Eversley, GOP Hears a Mandate;
National Victories Kick Republican Agenda Into High Gear, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Nov.
7, 2002, at 1A.
122. See Bent E. Sorensen & Oved Yosah, Is State Fiscal Policy Asymmetric Over the
Business Cycle?, in ECONOMIC REVIEW-FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY,
Third Quarter 2001, at 48 (arguing that balanced budget rules limit policy flexibility and
exacerbate the business cycle). But see id. at 49 (arguing that "political 'sacred cows' "can
grow to inefficient levels during economic expansions and be unpopular to cut during
downturns).
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downturns often create enhanced needs, such as in the case of the
state's unemployment insurance program 23 and the greater volatility
resulting from the trend toward globally open markets, 24 the case for
government services is at its greatest during downturns and at its least
during good times. Unless one posits that the legislature can predict
when downturns will come and how large they will be, such that
government saving will solve the planning problem, there is a strong
case for financial flexibility across the business cycle that can adapt to
changes as they arise. Further, political process federalism involves
state and federal legislators making decisions about the optimal
balance between state and federal responsibilities. 25 Arguments for
decentralization in policy matters are, plainly, directly dependent on
the capacity of the more localized governments to achieve policy
goals.126
B. Recent Judicial Trends
While legislative law and policymaking have significantly
impacted state budgets in recent years, so too have judicial decisions.
In North Carolina's state budget, education is the two-ton gorilla. In
recent Supreme Court of North Carolina jurisprudence, the same
might be said about Leandro v. State.127 Decided in 1997, the decision
added to a number of path-breaking state supreme court decisions
around the nation interpreting state constitutional guarantees of
public education to contain an implicit minimum standard
requirement. 128 The notion that the state's constitutional guarantee of
public education129 might implicate judicial review of the legislature's
solution potentially foretells a whole new era of litigation over public
education. The Supreme Court of North Carolina, in an opinion
written by Chief Justice Burley Mitchell, adopted a four-prong test
for determining what constitutes a "sound basic education," thus
123. See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 69-76 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 97-98, 107-10 and accompanying text.
126. Cf. Dale Bails & Margie A. Tieslau, The Impact of Fiscal Constitutions on State
and Local Expenditures, 20 CATO J. 255, 271 (2000) ("[T]he institutional framework
within which policy spending decisions are made clearly is influenced by the presence of
certain fiscal discipline mechanisms."), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/
cj20n2/cj2On2-7.pdf.
127. 346 N.C. 336, 488 S.E.2d 249 (1997).
128. See Margaret Rose Westbrook, Comment, School Finance Litigation Comes to
North Carolina, 73 N.C. L. REV. 2123, 2125-34 (1995) (reviewing several cases involving
school finance litigation).
129. N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2(1) (guaranteeing "a general and uniform system of free
public schools ... wherein equal opportunities shall be provided for all students").
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holding:
For purposes of our Constitution, a "sound basic education" is
one that will provide the student with at least: (1) sufficient
ability to read, write, and speak the English language and a
sufficient knowledge of fundamental mathematics and physical
science to enable the student to function in a complex and
rapidly changing society; (2) sufficient fundamental knowledge
of geography, history, and basic economic and political systems
to enable the student to make informed choices with regard to
issues that affect the student personally or affect the student's
community, state, and nation; (3) sufficient academic and
vocational skills to enable the student to successfully engage in
post-secondary education or vocational training; and (4)
sufficient academic and vocational skills to enable the student
to compete on an equal basis with others in further formal
education or gainful employment in contemporary society.
130
This guarantee will probably require substantial attention and
funding in order to ensure compliance and minimize litigation
associated with the Leandro standard.3 Further, the new "sound
basic education" requirement is just as inflexible as the balanced
budget provision of the constitution-it makes no exceptions for
revenue shortfalls or economic downturns. This ruling is hardly
unprecedented. From 1971 to 1997, twelve state supreme courts held
that their respective states failed to meet the requirements of their
state constitutions' education clauses.132  All state constitutions
130. Leandro, 346 N.C. at 347, 488 S.E.2d at 255.
131. See generally Andrew Broy, Comment, Charter Schools and Educational Reform:
How State Constitutional Challenges Will Alter Charter School Legislation, 79 N.C. L. REV.
493 (2001) (discussing the impact of Leandro on the charter school movement); Kelly
Thompson Cochran, Comment, Beyond School Financing: Defining the Constitutional
Right to an Adequate Education, 78 N.C. L. REV. 399 (2000) (discussing jurisprudence in
the area of constitutional guarantees of education); Westbrook, supra note 128, at 2147-79
(previewing the Leandro litigation).
132. See ANNA LUKEMEYER, COURTS As POLICYMAKERS: SCHOOL FINANCE
REFORM LITIGATION 52-53 (2003) (listing the ten decisions from 1971 to 1996 of that
disposition); see also Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 808
(Ariz. 1994) (holding that the financing scheme for public education violates the
constitutional requirement to provide a public education); DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No.
30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 95 (Ark. 1983) (same); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 374 (Conn.
1977) (same); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 189 (Ky. 1989)
(same); McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 517-18 (Mass.
1993) (same); Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Montana, 769 P.2d 684, 690 (Mont.
1990) (same); Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 363 (N.J. 1990) (same); Edgewood Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 392 (Tex. 1989) (same); Campbell County Sch. Dist. v.
Wyoming, 907 P.2d 1238, 1244 (Wyo. 1995) (same). Lukemeyer incorrectly refers to
School Administrative District No. I v. Commissioner as a decision in which the court ruled
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presently include some obligation for the state to provide for public
education,133 so the constitutional gravity of education spending is a
universal feature of state budgetary responsibilities.
At the federal level, several trends in United States Supreme
Court jurisprudence place further responsibilities on state
governments. In the past decade, there has been a slow but steady
trend towards curbing the power of the federal government under the
limitations of the Interstate Commerce Clause 13 4 and the Tenth
Amendment.135 In the 1992 case New York v. United States,'36 the
Court for the first time declared a federal act unconstitutional as
impermissibly appropriating state power for its own regulatory
purposes.137 This newly emboldened defense of state sovereignty
soon found expression in a revived Interstate Commerce Clause,
which the Supreme Court in United States v. Lopez'38 held did not
grant Congress the power to prohibit guns on the campuses of public
schools.'39 While the impact of these doctrines remains unclear, 4 ° the
in favor of the plaintiffs' challenge to the constitutionality of the state education system.
See LUKEMEYER, supra, at 53; Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 1 v. Commissioner, 659 A.2d 854,
858 (Me. 1995). In 1997, the Supreme Court of North Carolina, see Leandro v. State, 346
N.C. 336, 347, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255 (1997), and the Ohio Supreme Court, see Derolph v.
Ohio, 677 N.E.2d 733, 737 (Ohio 1996), also held that their respective states' education
systems did not satisfy constitutional requirements to provide for public education. Thus,
from 1971 to 1997, twelve state high courts found their school systems constitutionally
deficient.
133. See LUKEMEYER, supra note 132, at 6.
134. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8(3).
135. Id. amend. X.
136. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
137. See Paul Lund, The Decline of Federal Common Law, 76 B.U. L. REV. 895, 895-96
(1996).
138. 514 U.S. 549 (1995); see Daniel A. Farber, Symposium, Reflections on United
States v. Lopez: The Constitution's Forgotten Cover Letter: An Essay on the New
Federalism and the Original Understanding, 94 MICH. L. REV. 614, 622-26 (1995)
(analyzing in detail the U.S. Supreme Court's doctrinal shift in Lopez).
139. See Farber, supra note 138, at 642-43. See generally Judge Louis H. Pollak,
Symposium, Reflections on United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 533 (1995)
(analyzing the implications of the case).
140. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (striking down the
Violence Against Women Act of 1994 as beyond Congress's power under the Interstate
Commerce Clause); United States v. Alfonzo Coward, 151 F. Supp. 2d 544, 554 (E.D. Pa.
2001), remanded 296 F.3d 176 (3d Cir. 2002) (sustaining an Interstate Commerce Clause
challenge to federal gun law); see also Gordon G. Young, The Significance of Border
Crossings: Lopez, Morrison, and the Fate of Congressional Power to Regulate Goods, and
Transactions Connected with Them, Based on Prior Passage through Interstate Commerce,
61 MD. L. REV. 177, 178-80 (2002) (arguing that not all instances of interstate border
crossings give the federal government power to regulate under the Interstate Commerce
Clause). Morrison and Alfonzo Coward illustrate that the Interstate Commerce Clause
challenges are certainly viable, but the specific foundations that they draw will only
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
philosophical posture that they take expands the prerogatives of the
states under the U.S. Constitution in the modern governing era.
Tenth Amendment protections are slowly but steadily being fleshed
out in the federal court system.4 Congress's Interstate Commerce
Clause power has likewise become a bit more unstable in both
Supreme Court and lower federal court jurisprudence. 42 These
trends have not developed enough to impact the state budgets,
though they suggest that states may have greater policy responsibility
in the future, given the glacially advancing limits on congressional
power. 143 Thus, as the states gradually obtain more responsibility to
make policy decisions, there will be correspondingly greater demands
on the state budget.
Moreover, a quieter but perhaps much more significant trend has
occurred within the realm of federal court power under the current
Supreme Court. In a line of cases delineating the limits within which
federal courts can enact rules, the Supreme Court repeatedly directed
the federal courts to defer to state law as opposed to drawing from
federal jurisprudence, absent a clear grant of power by the national
government.144 The states have thus been given significantly greater
responsibility to fill in the policy gaps left by federal law in recent
years.45
The significance of these legal trends for the optimal financial
structure of state government is not that tax levels need to change,
but more broadly that financial flexibility is a necessary corollary to
managing that enhanced responsibility.' This assertion is, as
contended in the previous Section on legislative approaches to
become clear as the courts apply these doctrines in subsequent cases. See J. Mitchell
Pickerill, Leveraging Federalism: The Real Meaning of the Rehnquist Court's Federalism
Jurisprudence for States, 66 ALB. L. REV. 823, 826 (2003).
141. See Lund, supra note 137, at 896 n.6 (referencing U.S. Supreme Court and circuit
court cases fleshing out Tenth Amendment protections). See generally George J. Thomas,
The Brady Act, the Tenth Amendment, and America's Gun Cult, 30 UWLA L. REV. 23
(1999) (analyzing further Tenth Amendment usages in the context of gun control and the
Brady Act); Michael Van Arsdall, Comment, Enforcing the Enforcement Clause: City of
Boerne v. Flores Chips Away at Congressional Power, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 249, 291-92
(1998) (discussing a case that, in the opinion of the author, is consonant with Tenth
Amendment protections in the course of striking down federal law). Professor Nagel
assures us, however, that the sky is not falling, and that the Rehnquist Court has not
embarked on a grand scheme to hamstring the federal government with the Tenth
Amendment. NAGEL, supra note 92, at 38-39.
142. See supra notes 138-39.
143. See supra note 136-40.
144. See Lund, supra note 137, at 895-901.
145. See id. at 900-01.
146. See Sorensen & Yosah, supra note 122, at 48.
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federalism, not merely reactive. Rather, the capability of the states
and their receptiveness to take on responsibility in the modern
American governmental system is also a relevant factor in judicial
protections of their role. If states remain hamstrung by restrictive
financing options, the argument for their policy role being protected
by constitutional doctrine as well as statutory interpretation of the
scope of federal administrative power is substantially weakened. 147 In
that sense, the financial strength of the states is an integral part of the
ongoing debate over the virtues of federalism and localized control of
decision-making power.
While none of these decisions, save perhaps Leandro v. State, is
likely to spawn fiscal disaster, in concert they create an important new
set of long-term responsibilities for state governments. The federal
court decisions also resonate with political rhetoric of the last decade
that extols the virtues of acting at the state-as opposed to the
federal-level. 48 While Leandro applies only to North Carolina, a
growing number of state supreme courts have come to similar
conclusions with respect to their constitutional provisions for
education under state governments' wings.'49 The federal court
147. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 415 (holding, in its definition of the
scope of federal legislative power, that the "constitution [was] intended to endure for ages
to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs"); see also
Lino A. Graglia, Revitalizing Democracy, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 165, 166-67 (2000)
(arguing that doctrinal evolution in constitutional approaches to federalism should
embody notions of a "living Constitution" and adaptation to "new circumstances").
Professor Graglia argues that highly deferential review of congressional assertions of
federal power, in which the courts defer to congressional judgment on the scope of its
constitutional power, is worse than no review at all because it suggests to the Congress
that its policy decisions are constitutionally sound. Id. at 167. However, he prefers
political process federalism to judicially monitored federalism. Id. Cf. Morton J. Horwitz,
Foreword, The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism,
107 HARV. L. REV. 32, 51-56 (1993) (providing a historical overview of legal theorists and
judges who have embraced the notion of a living Constitution that adapts to the needs and
practical abilities of governments); William Jeffrey, Jr., The Constitution: "A Firm
National Government", in How FEDERAL IS THE CONSTITUTION? 16, 27-30 (Robert A.
Goldwin & William A. Schambra eds., 1987) (arguing that there are few limits on federal
power); David M. Kennedy, Federalism and the Force of History, in How FEDERAL IS
THE CONSTITUTION?, supra, at 67-83 (Robert A. Goldwin & William A. Schambra eds.,
1987) (illustrating the impact of economic and political change on evolving constitutional
approaches to federalism). But see Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law
System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and
Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 38 (Amy
Gutmann ed., 1997) (arguing that constitutional interpretation must be firmly rooted in
the original understanding of the text, not in evolving notions that take practical impacts
of rulings into consideration).
148. See infra Part III.A.
149. See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 211 (Ky. 1989)
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decisions limiting the power of the national government, of course,
impact all states as actors in the federal system. Thus, these trends
have broad application across the country.
C. New Economic Realities
Bridging the fiscal deficits of 2001-02 proved to be a two-year
nightmare for both the governor and the General Assembly. 150 In the
words of the Raleigh-based News and Observer, "Lawmakers called it
the worst budget crisis since the Great Depression."'51 The General
Assembly had to make up a nearly $2 billion shortfall, given the
ongoing financial obligations and policy priorities of the state and
sharply declining revenues1 2 The severity of the recession in North
Carolina exceeded that of many other states, given the sharp declines
in manufacturing and tobacco, traditionally important economic
activities for the state. 53 The number of skilled jobs available in the
high-paying technology sector also declined.154
North Carolina's experience was hardly unique. Throughout
state legislatures across the nation, lawmakers faced similar dilemmas
of revenue shortfalls and balanced budget requirements pinching the
budget process.'55 This occurred despite consistent state budget
(holding that the state's common schools must be adequately funded, substantially
uniform, and that every child be afforded equal opportunity); Claremont Sch. Dist. v.
Governor, 635 A.2d 1375, 1376 (N.H. 1993) (holding that the State has a duty to provide
an education to every educable child in public school); Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d
359, 368-69 (N.Y. 1982) (holding that the state constitution requires only minimal
acceptable facilities and services, not equality); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d
71, 76-77 (Wash. 1978) (en banc) (holding that the State has a mandatory duty to make
ample provision for basic education of all resident children through a uniform system);
Alabama Coalition for Equity, Inc. v. Hunt, No. CV-90-883-R (Ala. Cir. Ct. 1993),
reprinted in Opinion of the Justices No. 338, 624 So.2d 107, 165-66 (Ala. 1993) (holding
that the State must provide all school-age children with substantially equitable and
adequate educational opportunities).
150. See Wade Rawlins, Budget Woes Not Over, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),
Sept. 21, 2002, at Al; Wade Rawlins, Easley Seeks to Raise Sales Tax, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Aug. 17, 2001, at Al.
151. Kane, supra note 43.
152. Id.
153. Meredith Barkley, Charlotte Jobless Spike Highest, GREENSBORO NEWS &
RECORD, June 29, 2001, at B10; Amy Martinez, State's Jobless Rate Rises Substantially,
NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 25,2003, at D1.
154. Martinez, supra note 153.
155. See NAT'L ASS'N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, THE FISCAL SURVEY OF STATES
2-3 (May 2002), available at http://www.nasbo.org/Publications/fiscsurv/
may2002fiscalsurvey.pdf; Rob Christensen & Amy Gardner, More Red Ink, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 24, 2002, at Al (explaining that Virginia, Georgia, and
South Carolina, for example, have similar budget shortfalls); see also BUDGET
SHORTFALLS, supra note 48, at 1-2 (summarizing the financial difficulties of the states in
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surpluses from only a few years before. 15 6 However, one other major
economic shock was entirely unique to the state-Hurricane Floyd of
1999.157 In addition to creating a supply-side shock to the eastern half
of the state's tax base through extensive crop damage and flooding,'58
the natural disaster also increased fiscal outlays to help victims cope
with loss.'59 In the process, the State was forced to drain the rainy day
fund, a mechanism designed to help the State cope with budget
shortfalls through savings rather than financing.1 6  In this respect,
North Carolina's recent economic experience illustrates a
fundamental shortcoming of the balanced budget requirement. Even
when the state enjoys an unprecedented economic boom, as it did in
the 1990s, and saves during that time in anticipation of future
budgetary needs, a major hurricane plus a recession can easily wipe
out this attempted provision for the future. Thus, to no small extent
the current budget crisis was caused not by poor fiscal planning but by
a constitutional straitjacket that can constrict even responsible
lawmakers. This recent experience shows an intractable problem
with relying on the rainy day fund mechanism for smoothing out
financial resources across time, where recessions, natural disasters,
and fiscal needs fluctuate. The rainy day fund combined with the
balanced budget rule, while it has the advantage of requiring the
highest caliber of fiscal discipline, errantly presumes that budget
planners can predict the future 16' in addition to relying precariously
fiscal year 2002).
156. W. Mark Crain and James C. Miller III, Budget Process and Spending Growth, 31
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1021, 1021 (1990).
157. See 2000 CAFR, supra note 69, at 9.
158. John Wagner, Hunt Likely to Call Special Session, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), Oct. 14, 1999, at Al.
159. See 2000 CAFR, supra note 69, at 9 (reporting that the General Assembly
allocated $836.6 million for flood relief in a special session devoted to the disaster).
160. John Wagner, Don't Fret About Cuts, Hunt Aides Say, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 22, 1999, at Al.
161. See Stephanie Schmitt-Groh6 & Martfn Uribe, Balanced-Budget Rules,
Distortionary Taxes, and Aggregate Instability, 105 J. POL. ECON. 976, 977 (1997). The
authors present an economic model that demonstrates that "under a balanced-budget rule
the rational expectations equilibrium can be indeterminate." Id. In other words, assuming
that lawmakers exhibit rational expectations behavior, where they predict the future based
on the best available knowledge, the balanced budget rule itself creates economic
indeterminacy. See id. at 982-86 (modeling the point of indeterminacy in the model).
Relaxing the assumption of rational expectations by introducing self-serving motivations
and imperfect information within the legislature would increase the indeterminacy of their
model. Self-serving motivations, for example, would include overspending during booms
as the result of political pressures, and imperfect information is the common phenomenon
of not knowing what the future macroeconomic trend will be.
2004] 1221
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
on a particularly austere level of lawmaker altruism. 16 2  Financial
instruments that allow lawmakers sufficient flexibility to deal with
problems more accurately as they arise, rather than engage in
guesswork as to what the future will hold, would improve the
budgetary climate substantially. The thesis of this Comment is that
coupling increased flexibility with constitutional restrictions on
spending would be more consistent with the practical realities of the
budget process.163
The resulting policy choices have been harsh. While social
service and crime problems tend to increase during times of economic
hardship, the State was forced to cut social services targeting them in
order to close the gap.1" Services that were considered to be less
essential were cut by a much greater proportion.'65 Spending on the
environment and natural resources, for example, was cut by nine
percent in the 2002-03 budget.66 Likewise, the pension plans of state
employees and higher education tuition rates helped shoulder a
significant share of the burden. 67
Lastly, a note about the history of revenue sources further
illustrates the changed circumstances. In 1868, when the
constitutionally mandated balanced budget originated, the primary
source of revenue for state and local governments was the property
tax.168 In 1900, for example, seventy-seven percent of combined state
and local revenues came from the property tax. 169  This trend
continued until the 1930s, by which time the State had weaned itself
off the property tax. 7° During this time period, the State also began
funding local governmental initiatives at a much greater rate.' The
property tax has historically been administered almost exclusively at
162. See Sorensen & Yosah, supra note 122, at 49 (noting the tendency of politicians to
overspend during booms). This point is a particularly important argument against relaxing
the balanced budget rule because it suggests that lawmakers can overspend during booms
and then rely on borrowing to get through revenue downturns. This is a key reason why
relaxing the balanced budget rule should be accompanied by a companion restriction in
spending growth in order to maximize flexibility while not encouraging the government to
grow beyond its efficient size.
163. See infra Part III.D.
164. See ELAINE MEJIA, THE FINAL BUDGET AGREEMENT: LAST, BUT NOT LEAST?
3 (2003).
165. Richard Sutch, Has Social Spending Grown Out of Control?, CHALLENGE, May-
June 1996, at 11 (noting the countercyclical nature of social spending).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 4.
168. See STATE AND LOCAL, supra note 11, at 8.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 8-9.
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the local level, 72 and as trends toward state implementation of
services increased, the locally assessed property tax became a less
attractive option.173 The significance of the property tax is that, as a
revenue source, it is very stable. 74 Property values are assessed only
occasionally, so the taxes that flow from them remain relatively
constant amid economic fluctuations. Thus, revenue stream
instability was not nearly the concern that it is today, given the State's
dependence on sales tax and income tax collections. 75
D. Unsolved Policy Issues Facing the States
This Comment does not argue for a particular level of taxation;
rather, it suggests that trends in law and policy call for a constitutional
modification of the budget process. However, some reference to
significant and progressing policy shortcomings is necessary to
illustrate the ongoing pressures on the modern state budget, legal
obligations of the state, and the importance of maintaining a constant
expenditure stream that is more independent of economic and
demographic fluctuations.
Fundamental issues of legal rights as defended by the judicial
branch form an important starting point. In his 2001 State of the
Judiciary address, newly-elected Chief Justice I. Beverly Lake
suggested that the existing funding level was inadequate for the
judiciary to meet the legal needs of the state. 76 Framing the problem
as one of constitutional gravity, Chief Justice Lake asserted that the
existing budget for the state court system "has not been able to meet
adequately our constitutional responsibilities and expand our services
as demanded by our growing population." '77  In particular, he
lamented the impact of judicial shortages on children through
juvenile court, domestic dispute adjudication, and domestic violence:
I want to stress to you that each and every one of these children
is just as important to North Carolina as any child in our public
schools or in Smart Start, and I submit to you, they are much
172. See JAMES A. MAXWELL, FINANCING STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 126-
27 (rev. ed. 1969).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 128, 133.
175. COMM'N TO MODERNIZE STATE FINANCES, supra note 35, at 2 (explaining North
Carolina's reliance on income and sales tax revenues).
176. Chief Justice I. Beverly Lake, Jr., State of the Judiciary Address 2 (2001),
available at http://www.aoc.state.nc.us/www/copyright/aoc/speeches/lakesoj.pdf.
177. Id.; see also Matthew Eisley, Judiciary Funding Urged, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 27, 2001, at A3 (reporting on the Chief Justice's address to the
General Assembly).
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more at risk .... We must not let them down by failing to fund
their future. '78
One of the important tools of the budget-cutter in lean years is
not filling job vacancies until the fiscal shortage abates. Shortages in
judicial staffing, the Chief Justice lamented, not only decrease the
confidence that the public has in the court system and increase the
frustration associated with it, but they also implicate basic issues of
efficiency. 79 For example, failure to adequately staff the courts with
court reporters sometimes results in increased confusion, delay, and
expense to the litigants.
181
On the criminal justice side, prisoners' rights continue to be at
risk. Given that they are in the full custody of the State, the State has
substantial responsibilities to ensure prisoners' constitutionally
protected safety. 181  In particular, the state's older jails that lack
sprinkler systems and centrally controlled jail doors may be of
significantly greater risk to inmates in the event of a fire.'82 In this
respect, judicial decisions specifying the constitutional rights of
prisoners83 begin to push against the state constitution's mandate for
a balanced budget. Like Leandro's requirement that the North
Carolina General Assembly provide a "sound basic education,"'
84
conflicting state constitutional pressures may indeed invite increased
litigation over the constitutionality of North Carolina budgets, a
situation that is not without precedent in other states.185
178. Lake, supra note 176, at 5.
179. See id. at 3, 5.
180. See id. at 3. In the words of Chief Justice Lake:
The damage from this kind of breakdown is measured not just in the cost of
wasted time and resources, but also in the enormous amount of bad will and
hostility generated and directed toward our court system by all those citizens who
have been made to suffer the wasteful loss of valuable time out of their lives ....
The cost of a court reporter is minimal compared to this.
Id.
181. See generally Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002) (upholding the importance of
humane treatment of prisoners and safe jail conditions as implicated in the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause).
182. Andrea Weigl & Karin Schill Rives, Older County Jails Lack Sprinklers, Remote
Control Doors, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), May 6, 2002, at A10.
183. Article I, section 27, of the North Carolina Constitution echoes the U.S.
Constitution's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. See U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 27.
184. Leandro v. State, 346 N.C. 336, 353, 488 S.E.2d 249, 258 (1997).
185. See generally Darryl B. Simko, Of Pensions, State Constitutional Contract
Protection, and Fiscal Restraint, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1059, 1064-71 (1996) (analyzing the
recent experience of Michigan, New York, and Illinois in terms of the conflicting duties of
the legislature to balance the budget while honoring state pension commitments and
contracts). Raiding pension funds to balance the budget, which has been one solution of
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Another area of concern is more abstract: the general tendency
of policymakers to resort to short-term fixes that impose long-term
costs when faced with budget pressures.186 In a sense, this practice is
itself a kind of borrowing. Bad policy in the present and greater costs
in the future are the heavy prices to pay for short-term savings. A
typical example of this trade-off is a reduction in social spending that
leads to increased crime in the future, which in turn translates to
higher court costs and more prisoners.'87 This may potentially be a
net fiscal loss for the state, even without considering the negative
impact of crime in society and the greatly decreased economic
productivity of convicts during incarceration.
These dilemmas, brewing below the surface at present, will
eventually surface and have to be faced regardless of the fact that
budget makers in a recession are more concerned with bridging the
existing fiscal gap than with solving new problems. The General
Assembly can, of course, design short-term fixes when fiscal times are
tough. In a worst case scenario, these fixes would become the subject
of state constitutional litigation that would begin to question whether
the state constitution is itself internally inconsistent-requiring the
General Assembly to provide a sound basic education for all students,
honor the contractual obligations to state pension plans, protect
prisoners' rights, and maintain a court system that does not
unconstitutionally delay criminal and civil trials, while still preserving
a balanced budget.'88
While this scenario may sound more like a clever thought
experiment than a realistic possibility, one state supreme court has
North Carolina's General Assembly, may also give rise to a takings claim if the pension
funds are to be regarded as private property. See id.
186. See Dorothy A. Brown, Fiscal Distress and Politics: The Bankruptcy Filing of
Bridgeport as a Case Study in Reclaiming Local Sovereignty, 11 BANKR. DEV. J. 625, 643-
44 (1995) (outlining the standard public choice theory of how politicians maximize short-
term gains, sometimes at the expense of the long-term public interest).
187. See Amy Gardner, Service Groups Fear Budget Ax, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), Apr. 22, 2002, at Al (reporting on the cuts in grants given to non-profits and the
possible long-term criminal costs associated with the cuts); see also John J. Donohue III &
Peter Siegelman, Allocating Resources Among Prisons and Social Programs in the Battle
Against Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 32-35 (1998) (describing the trade-off between
current social spending and future spending on crime prevention). Professors Donohue
and Siegelman make an empirical argument that targeted social spending towards at-risk
youth will yield lower long-term costs to the state for programs like Job Corps, but that
other programs like Head Start cannot be justified under a crime prevention rationale. Id.
at 35.
188. But see Leandro, 346 N.C. at 352, 488 S.E.2d at 258 ("It is axiomatic that the terms
or requirements of a constitution cannot be in violation of the same constitution-a
constitution cannot violate itself.").
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already handed down this legal bombshell. In Guinn v. Legislature,89
the Nevada Supreme Court determined that the competing
constitutional obligations on the state government were
irreconcilable a" ° and suspended the constitutional requirement of a
two-thirds vote to increase taxes. 1' Drawing a distinction between
substantive requirements of the government and procedural
requirements of the legislative process, the court held that the latter
must yield when in conflict.192 Because the legislature and governor
were unable to resolve the impasse over the budget, given the existing
contractual obligations of the State, the constitutional mandate for
"support and maintenance of the public schools," 193 and the
legislature's inability to muster a supermajority to raise taxes, the
court declared that the legislature was to proceed under simple
majority rule.194 Internal inconsistency in a constitution is quite
literally the precipice that can threaten the very viability of a
constitutional government, given its dependence on the constitution
as the immutable first principle on which the government is
founded. 195
III. MODERN ALTERNATIVES
A. Approaches Taken by Other Governments
Assuming now that there is a case for reconsidering the wisdom
of the balanced budget mandate, what practical alternatives are
available to policymakers? North Carolina's budget requirements are
relatively strict compared to other states' balanced budget provisions.
Some states merely require that the governor submit a balanced
budget to the legislature. 196 Idaho 97 and Texas' 98 do not compel the
189. 71 P.3d 1269 (en banc) (Nev. 2003), reh'g dismissed, clarified 76 P.3d 22 (Nev.
2003).
190. Id. at 1276.
191. Id. at 1275.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1272.
195. See People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 886 (Cal. 1972) ("[W]herever possible we
construe constitutional provisions in such a way as to reconcile potential conflict among
provisions and give effect to each ...."); Guinn, 71 P.3d at 1275; Leandro v. State, 346
N.C. 336, 352, 488 S.E.2d 249, 258 (1997) ("It is axiomatic that the terms or requirements
of a constitution cannot be in violation of the same constitution-a cinstitution cannot
violate itself."); Fino, supra note 48, at 775 (discussing the financial crunch that states have
suffered as a result of tax restrictions combined with spending mandates).
196. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, SIGNIFICANT
FEATURES OF FISCAL FEDERALISM, 1 BUDGET PROCESSES AND TAX SYSTEMS 6 (1993)
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governor to submit a balanced budget but do require the legislature
to pass a balanced budget, though the final deal between the
executive and legislature need not be balanced.199 Conversely,
Kansas mandates that the governor and legislature both present
balanced budgets, but does not impose a requirement that the final
deal be balanced.200  Lastly, Vermont, now alone among the states,
continues to impose no budgetary restrictions on lawmakers with
respect to budget balancing.
201
There are many other differences in the details of these
requirements across the country. For example, some states, such as
Massachusetts 21 Alabama,20 3  Alaska,204  and North Carolina,z°5
[hereinafter SIGNIFICANT FEATURES OF FISCAL FEDERALISM]. Examples of states that
require that the governor submit a balanced budget and nothing further include
California, New Hampshire, and Washington. Id. For more on state budget requirements,
see Jerry W. Calvert, The Popular Referendum Device and Equality of Voting Rights-
How Minority Suspension of the Laws Subverts "One Person-One Vote" in the States, 6
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 383, 395 (1997); GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BALANCED
BUDGET REQUIREMENTS: STATE EXPERIENCES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT 10 (1993), at http://archive.gao.gov/d44t15/148877.pdf (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review); see also NAT'L ASSOC. OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS,
BUDGET PROCESSES IN THE STATES 33-35 (2002) [hereinafter BUDGET PROCESSES IN
THE STATES] (summarizing balanced budget requirements for all fifty states and Puerto
Rico).
197. IDAHO CONST. art. VII, § 11.
198. TEX. CONST. art. III, § 49.
199. SIGNIFICANT FEATURES OF FISCAL FEDERALISM, supra note 196, at 6.
200. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-2927 (2002).
201. SIGNIFICANT FEATURES OF FISCAL FEDERALISM, supra note 196, at 6.
202. MASS. CONST. art. LXII, §§ 2, 3. These sections provide the following restriction:
Section 2. The commonwealth may borrow money to repel invasion, suppress
insurrection, defend the commonwealth, or to assist the United States in case of
war, and may also borrow money in anticipation of receipts from taxes or other
sources, such loan to be paid out of the revenue of the year in which it is created.
Section 3. In addition to the loans which may be contracted as before provided,
the commonwealth may borrow money only by a vote, taken by the yeas and
nays, of two-thirds of each house of the general court present and voting thereon.
The governor shall recommend to the general court the term for which any loan
shall be contracted.
Id.; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 29, § 6E (2003) (regulating the budget balancing by
statute); Opinion of Justices to Senate, 236 N.E.2d 523, 527 (Mass. 1968) (stating that
borrowing by public authorities under the control of the executive branch does not violate
the constitutional debt restriction).
203. ALA. CONST. art. XI, § 213, amended by ALA. CONST. amend. XXVI.
204. ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 8 ("No state debt shall be contracted unless authorized
by law for capital improvements or unless authorized by law for housing loans for
veterans, and ratified by a majority of the qualified voters of the State who vote on the
question.").
205. N.C. CONST. art. V, § 3; see also id. art. III, § 5(3) (requiring the Governor to
ensure that no actual fiscal deficit arises during the year).
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require balanced budgets as a part of the constitutional charter,
whereas Mississippi2 6 and Arkansas27 impose balanced budget
requirements solely by statute. 208  Further, some mechanisms are
stronger than others. For example, Idaho's constitution requires a
balanced budget, but apparently "there are no sanctions 2 9 for failing
to balance the budget, as the legislature has over-appropriated
budgets without successful challenge I.2 0  New York and Virginia do
not have balanced budget requirements with respect to bill passage,
but rather impose a requirement on the executive not to spend more
than actual revenues.a
When a particular year's revenue projections fall short of the
legislature's desired appropriations, there are two possible remedies
for preserving a constant supply of governmental goods and services:
spend the savings or borrow from the future. All states, including
North Carolina,212 have provisions for saving when revenues exceed
budgeted expenditures. 13 Virtually every state has a unique method
of dealing with such situations, ranging from complete legislative
discretion2 14 to the automatic reversion of excesses to a reserve
fund.215 North Carolina falls somewhere in the middle; by default,
25 % of the annual excesses go into the rainy day fund until they reach
5% of the general operations budget total for the year.216 However,
this mechanism is subject to the approval of the General Assembly 217
and the governor through the legislative process.
218
Eventually, however, shortfalls will occur. Just as few private
206. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 27-103 to -139 (2003).
207. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 19-2-104 (1987) (mandating that state officials not spend
more than their respective departments are appropriated). But cf. ARK. CONST. art. V,
§ 39 (requiring a supermajority of seventy-five percent for any budget that exceeds $2.5
million in spending on items other than education, highways, confederate pensions, and
state debt).
208. SIGNIFICANT FEATURES OF FISCAL FEDERALISM, supra note 196, at 6.
209. Id. at 7.
210. Id.
211. Id.; see also N.C. CONST. art. III, § 5(3) (requiring the Governor to maintain a
balanced budget during the fiscal year).
212. See infra notes 229-32 and accompanying text.
213. SIGNIFICANT FEATURES OF FISCAL FEDERALISM, supra note 196, at 8 (noting
that Kansas and Kentucky deposit money for state budget stabilization funds by
appropriation).
214. See id.
215. Id. (noting that Colorado has an automatic mechanism).
216. COMM'N TO MODERNIZE STATE FINANCES, supra note 35, at 13.
217. Id. at 9.
218. N.C. CONST. art. II, § 22(1).
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citizens go through life relying exclusively on savings,219 so too can
governments be expected to run into severe-though temporary-
shortfalls caused either by recessions or unpredictable expenditures
resulting from, for example, natural disasters.22 ° If states like North
Carolina should no longer be held to such strict budgetary
requirements, 221 there needs to be some workable policy solution that
gives policymakers flexibility, while at the same time not giving the
foxes the keys to the henhouse. Unrestricted, chronic borrowing
remains as economically destructive as it was perceived to be in the
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, when the American system
of governance was being codified.222 Even though the Model State
Constitution does not restrict borrowing, 23 such a permissive
recommendation would run the risk of creating precisely the
temptation against which the balanced budget provision was designed
to protect.
Perhaps the single biggest contributor to this danger is the public
choice problem that lawmakers who pledge the state's full faith and
credit in return for long-term debt do not internalize the full cost of
their actions. Most legislators are highly unlikely to be in the
legislature by the time a twenty- or thirty-year bond fully matures.24
For that reason, they face a skewed incentive structure; as profit
maximizers, they will face the temptation of creating a project in the
present time or lowering taxes to the great applause of their
constituents while writing off the cost to a later generation of
219. See F. H. Buckley, The Debtor as Victim, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1078, 1081 (2002)
(reviewing TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN
DEBT (2000)).
220. See supra notes 157-62 and accompanying text.
221. Approximately half of the states require not just balanced budgets to be proposed
but also to be either passed or implemented by the executive. SIGNIFICANT FEATURES OF
FISCAL FEDERALISM, supra note 196, at 6.
222. In general, early American politicians were highly skeptical of public debt and
worried that it, in the words of President Jefferson, could constitute "the greatest of the
dangers to be feared" in the American governmental experiment. Id. at 13. Even the
statist Alexander Hamilton recommended that public debt be avoided so as to build the
nation's credit. Id. President Jackson built a good portion of his presidency around
abolishing the national debt and has the distinction of being the only president in the
nation's history to have passed on a debt-free government to his successor. Id. at 13-14.
For more on period views on public debt, see generally William Breit, Starving the
Leviathan: Balanced Budget Prescriptions before Keynes, in FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (James M. Buchanan & Richard E. Wagner eds., 1978).
223. Article VII of the Model State Constitution does not contain a balanced budget
provision. See MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION art. VII (Nat'l Mun. League 1968).
224. See generally Einer Elhauge, Are Term Limits Undemocratic?, 64 U. CHI. L. REV.
83, 146 (1997) (stating that the average tenure, even at the higher rates of incumbency in
the period studied, was about twelve years for persons in the United States Congress).
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taxpayers.225 Such may be the case for the current federal debt load,
currently over $4.5 trillion.226 It is hardly surprising that there are no
constitutional limitations on the national Congress in maintaining
fiscal responsibility.
B. Procedural Alternatives
Currently, state and federal governments in the United States
restrict themselves to no debt without referendum or virtually
unrestricted borrowing, or various procedural limitations on debt
creation in the legislative process. 2 7 Within that range, there are a
number of mechanisms between utter fiscal freedom and the absolute
prohibition on state debt without a referendum/special exception.
One possibility is simply to make the balanced budget requirement
statutory instead of constitutional. This approach, however, is
probably neither realistic nor particularly desirable. At the practical
level, the General Assembly might pass a statute that provided that,
should a voter referendum on repealing the constitutional balanced
budget requirement pass, a statutory mandate would become
effective. Of course, such a deal with the voters would still amount to
the legislature asking the citizenry to give it the keys to the henhouse
just to keep it safe. While a legislature that later decided to void the
statute would probably face the wrath of the voters, a shrewd
legislature would be able to chip away at the law so as to render it
ineffective while flying under their constituents' political radar.
More palatable would be constitutional amendments that limit
the legislature in some appropriate manner. Requiring a
supermajority-perhaps either three-fifths or two-thirds-of both
houses of the General Assembly in order to create public debt
without voter approval would be one such check, virtually requiring
some form of bipartisan resolve in order to create debt. While this
would give a unified legislature flexibility to deal with a budget crisis
with whatever financial instrument it sees as appropriate, it does not
fully deal with the public choice problem of lawmakers putting off
payment until after they leave office.
225. See Brown, supra note 186, at 643-44.
226. Kaye, supra note 107, at 156-57. See generally Neal Devins, Budget Reform and
the Balance of Powers, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 993, 993 (1990) (discussing budget deficit
from the purview of fifteen years ago).
227. Cynthia Sneed, An Examination of the Effects of Balanced Budget Laws on State
Borrowing Costs, 14 J. PUB. BUDGETING ACCT. & FIN. MGMT. 159, 162-64 (Winter 2002)
(providing a "summary of the state balanced budget laws including where in the budgeting
process the budget is required to be balanced").
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C. Substantive Alternatives
In addition to the above procedural devices, there are a number
of financial tools designed to alleviate fiscal fluctuations under the
constraint of heightened policy obligations.228 First, an increase in the
size of the required contribution to the Savings Reserve Fund, or
rainy day fund, would help to mandate greater fiscal austerity.229
Currently, the State must deposit twenty-five percent of the money
collected in taxes but not allocated in a given fiscal year.230 By raising
this requirement to, for example, fifty percent, the State would merely
be requiring that more of the windfall from a stronger-than-expected
economy would be reserved for future needs. This recommendation,
adopted by the Governor's Commission to Modernize State
2311Finances, makes excellent sense, but it does not solve the problem
of unforeseen fiscal shocks.232
Moreover, as the rainy day fund increases in size, this perverse
incentive structure creates an incentive for lawmakers to fabricate or
exaggerate crises in a given governmental program, crises that call for
spending out of the rainy day fund. Given that lawmakers do not
know when a recession will occur, they will, facing uncertainty, be
even more inclined to spend the money in the current time period,
given that the general expectation during economic booms is that
they will continue for the foreseeable future. The perceived current
need for a given program is simply more palpable than the
unforeseen, speculative future recessionary need. Lastly, even if the
legislature were to act in an unusually prudent manner and save for
the future, the rainy day fund does involve tying up economic
resources in the government's coffers.
Going the opposite direction and simply requiring spending cuts
in down years would solve the problem, albeit in a rather harsh
manner. While this Comment strongly contends that spending cuts
which follow declines in tax receipts are bad policy in the modern
governing environment, it must mention the alternative. Not only is
it a major part of the current approach, but also it has intuitive appeal
for a private citizen who would rather have guaranteed austerity in
228. See generally BUDGET PROCESSES IN THE STATES, supra note 196, at 59-66
(summarizing the contingency fund programs in all fifty states).
229. See COMM'N TO MODERNIZE STATE FINANCES, supra note 35, at 14
(recommending an increase in the mandatory contribution to the Savings Reserve
Account).
230. Id. at 13.
231. Id. at 14.
232. See supra notes 150-63 and accompanying text.
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the state budget than have to engage in the costs of overseeing the
public sector's fiscal responsibility as a voter. This Comment,
however, takes the position that the modern tax structure, policy
priorities, the heightened need for public spending in recessionary
periods, and recent judicial trends require greater flexibility in order
to create the optimal state governing situation.
Mechanisms that best internalize the cost of debt are most
preferable, because they would give legislators the incentive to design
fiscal policy with fuller consideration of the true costs of deficit
spending. They also lower the need for citizens to oversee whether
their representatives are acting in a fiscally responsible manner. One
plausible mechanism would preserve the balanced budget
requirement but change it to a longer-term balance, in which only the
four-year total need be debt-free. In effect, it preserves the existing
mechanism but allows for more flexibility in the event of a short-term
fiscal shock. The advantage of this mechanism is its intuitive appeal.
In the practical setting of a voter referendum, amendment proponents
can make the argument that the legislature could have planned better
around the current fiscal pinch had it been able to deal with a four-
year budgetary cycle instead of the current two-year cycle. Further,
by aligning this period with the governor's four-year term, the voters
can hold the executive clearly accountable for a four-year plan.
The downside of this proposition is that the uncertainty of
forecasting into the future remains. While it would give lawmakers
greater flexibility if a shortfall occurred early in the four-year cycle, it
would hardly be different from the current system if the unanticipated
shortfall occurred in the last year of the cycle. In that situation, as in
the current one, solvency in that year would depend on ex ante saving
for the uncertain future.
D. A Deal: Short Term Debt Creation Plus a Cap on Spending
Increases
Perhaps the best instrument for the voters to give to the
legislature and governor would be the power to create short-term
debt without a referendum. By delegating the power to create fiscal
instruments like a five-year bond, the problem of predicting future
shortfalls is avoided, while the legislature still must pay the debt back
soon enough that the legislators and/or political party that advocated
for the bonds would remain closely connected to their maturation
date. Even if individual legislators retire before the maturation date
of the five-year bond, their political party would likely still remain
accountable to the electorate for responsible decision-making.
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Because bonds would be short-term, there would be significantly less
opportunity to run up a lot of debt. Lastly, policymakers would have
the benefit of planning for the future based on a clearer picture of the
problem. Once the problem comes into focus, a more precise budget
can be crafted using responsible borrowing while maintaining fiscal
balance. The problem of having to go through the particularly
cumbersome and uncertain referendum procedure would be
unnecessary, except in the case where some over-arching problem
required long-term debt.233  This solution, then, achieves the
intuitively appealing result of broadening the fiscal period to a five-
year period while allowing solutions to be crafted as problems arise.
Because the period is so short, there is a strong disincentive to rack
up enormous amounts of debt like the federal government has done
while still giving the legislature the power to deal flexibly with
problems as they manifest themselves.
Allowing for short-term debt instruments without a referendum
gives the legislature an incentive to overspend, however, given that a
legislature can continue to add to the debt load with ever-larger
short-term debt creation. So, while short-term debt partially
internalizes the political costs of borrowing, it does not do so
completely. For that reason, a companion constitutional provision
that restricts expenditures to a set percentage of the state's gross
domestic product would give the voters the assurance that the
underlying overall tax bill would not spiral out of control.
Expenditure limitations are increasingly popular across the country.234
Tying increases in expenditures to the growth in personal income
without a voter referendum can be a strong form of restraining the
public sector235 and can offset the greater flexibility of added
233. As a testament to the difficulty of this procedure, it took a monumental, multi-
million dollar lobbying effort to get the higher education bond referendum passed in
North Carolina's 2002 general election. The bill to put the referendum on the ballot
unanimously passed both houses of the General Assembly, and the fiscally conservative
N.C. Citizens for Business and Industry led the publicity campaign for the referendum.
See Jane Stancill, $3.1 Billion Plan for N. C. Colleges Heads to Voters, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), May 19, 2000, at B1. As further testament to the energetic support the
referendum got from the state's leaders, news articles like this one virtually read like press
releases from the pro-referendum lobby.
234. See Michael J. New, Limiting Government Through Direct Democracy: The Case
of State Tax and Expenditure Limitations, POL'Y ANALYSIS No. 420, Dec. 13, 2001, at 4.
See generally John Hood, John Locke Foundation, Follow Easley's Lead: Spending Cap
Should Be Tightened, Constitutional, SPOTLIGHT No. 228, Mar. 6, 2003, at 2 (providing a
brief overview of the trend towards statutory and constitutional spending limitations),
available at http://www.johnlocke.org/acrobat/spotlights/3 6 03_spendingscap.pdf.
235. But see Tobin, supra note 1, at 155 (contending that a serious drawback of adding
constitutional limits on the budgetary process is increased judicial activism in budget
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flexibility in financing that would come from the above debt proposal.
This two-tiered referendum operates essentially as a bargain
that the legislature offers to the voters. In return for having greater
flexibility to smooth out sources of revenue, it consents to being
subjected to a strict cap on spending, which is, in the long run, simply
the definition of the liabilities that the government creates and for
which taxpayers are ultimately responsible. Both parties therefore
get what they most desire. The taxpayers get more assurance of fiscal
austerity than they currently have, and the General Assembly has
more fiscal flexibility to manage the continuity of government
services and to deal with short-term revenue shocks, a flexibility
which, as argued in Part II, it sorely needs in the modern economic
and policy environment.236 In the long run, politicians even benefit
somewhat from a spending growth cap because it reduces the ability
of the legislature during expansionary periods to spend as much as it
receives in the increased revenues coming from corporate and
personal income taxes, therefore creating expectations within and
outside the government for continued services at that level. The fact
that a legislature in the following economic recession cannot possibly
maintain that level of services absent a tax increase unfairly penalizes
the recession-era government in the political sphere while unfairly
rewarding the boom-era government.
That is precisely, however, what happened in North Carolina and
across the country in the 1990s expansion versus the early 2000s
recession. The unrealistic expectation of never-ending high state
revenues mushroomed government services during the 1990s237 and
left the subsequent politicians with the problem of having to deal out
the tough medicine when revenues collapsed and the fiscal crisis
developed.2 38 It is no surprise that Governor Easley, the recession-era
matters). Professor Tobin's concern certainly has been borne out in Guinn v. Legislature,
where the Nevada Supreme Court decided to suspend part of the constitution as a solution
to a political budget impasse. See generally Guinn v. Legislature, 71 P.3d 1269 (Nev.
2003), reh'g dismissed, clarified 76 P.3d 22 (Nev. 2003) (declaring a constitutional provision
requiring a two-thirds supermajority for revenue raising legislation void as inconsistent
with the constitutional requirement to fund public education); supra notes 189-95 and
accompanying text.
236. Part II, infra, develops a case for converging statutory, legal, and economic trends
creating a systemic fiscal dilemma for state government. See also Fino, supra note 48, at
775 (describing the financial impracticalities of voter referenda that constrain state
financial flexibility on the revenue side while calling for ongoing programs involving
substantial spending).
237. See supra notes 18, 53-63 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 17-18, 150-52 and accompanying text.
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governor, has proposed a spending cap,239 as his administration has
had to bargain with the General Assembly to hammer out the
unpopular cuts to programs that were so enthusiastically expanded in
the previous eight years.240
Expenditure limits now exist in well over half the states, either in
statutory or in constitutional form.2 4' The evidence on their ability to
restrain fiscal expansion is increasingly robust.242 Innovation at the
state level in expenditure limit mechanisms has been substantial. For
example, Colorado has perhaps the most austere form of spending
cap: its current form is a constitutional limit that bars increases in
spending beyond the previous year's level plus the rate of inflation.243
Connecticut 24 and Michigan,2 5 on the other hand, have spending
restrictions tied to increases in personal income, such that the overall
percentage of income that goes to the state government remains
relatively constant absent voter approval. Regardless of which
specific mechanism would be chosen, the deal would remain the
239. See Eric Dyer, Easley Backs Spending Cap, GREENSBORO NEWS & RECORD,
Feb. 25, 2003, at B12; see generally CONN. CONFERENCE OF MUNICIPALITIES,
CONNECTICUT'S SPENDING CAP: WHAT ARE THE FACTS? (Jan. 25, 2000) (noting that the
Connecticut spending cap originated during a recessionary period in 1991 in response to
the fiscal dilemmas of that budgetary period), http://www.ccm-ct.org/news/2000/cap6.pdf
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
240. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
241. New, supra note 234, at 4; see, e.g., CONN. CONST. art. III, § 18. The amendment
states, in relevant part:
The general assembly shall not authorize an increase in general budget
expenditures for any fiscal year above the amount of general budget
expenditures authorized for the previous fiscal year by a percentage which
exceeds the greater of the percentage increase in personal income or the
percentage increase in inflation, unless the governor declares an emergency or
the existence of extraordinary circumstances and at least three-fifths of the
members of each house of the general assembly vote to exceed such limit for the
purposes of such emergency or extraordinary circumstances.
Id.
242. See New, supra note 234, at 5-6. But see James Bennett & Thomas DiLorenzo,
Off-Budget Activities of Local Governments: The Bane of the Tax Revolt, 39 PUB. CHOICE
333-34 (1982) (noting that states can get around state-level spending limits by giving
responsibilities to local governments). In North Carolina, that criticism would be less
applicable, given that local governments are bound by the general prohibition on debt
creation absent a referendum. N.C. CONST. art. V, § 4. In addition, municipalities can
only impose taxes that the General Assembly authorizes. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-206
(2001).
243. COLO. CONST. art. X, § 20 ("The Taxpayer's Bill of Rights"); see also CAL.
CONST. art. XIIIB, § 1 (limiting increases in parts of the state budget to inflation plus
population growth). Cf. New, supra note 234, at 4 (noting that this limitation does not
pertain to total expenditures).
244. CONN. CONST. art. III, § 18.
245. MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 26.
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same: the voters give the legislature flexibility in return for spending
restrictions. Such a bargain would provide an incentive for the
legislature to put the referendum on the ballot, as well as for the
voters to ratify the amendments. The end result would be fiscal
austerity combined with the financial maturity that would give the
State a much stronger position in advocating for greater responsibility
over public policy matters at the federal level. With greater
accountability to the citizens with respect to spending, as well as
greatly expanded flexibility to provide continuous services across
revenue fluctuations, this approach would combine the best of both
worlds and answer perhaps one of the greater objections to
federalism-the question of whether the states are better equipped to
deal with policy problems than the federal government.4 6  This
recurring theme affects all areas of law in questions of federal-state
relations-congressional legislation,247  federal administrative
decisions,' and constitutional trends.2"9
CONCLUSION
North Carolina is but one of forty-eight states that are projected
to face fiscal shortfalls for 2003-04.250 While aid from the federal
government to help stem the problem would be a convenient fix,
251
the large budget deficit at the federal level, along with impending tax
246. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Brownfields, Environmental Federalism, and
Institutional Determinism, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 3 (1997)
(contending that the federal government has generally outpaced the states in expertise
regarding environmental policy); Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate
Environmental Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2341, 2375 n.123 (1996) (arguing that the
federal government has a strong argument for control over environmental policy because
of its greater expertise that states have trouble duplicating); Joel H. Swift, Fiscal
Federalism: Who Controls the States' Purse Strings?, 63 TEMP. L. REV. 251, 254 (1990)
("[I]ndependent state initiation of spending programs, such as unemployment
compensation insurance and income assistance to dependent families, has furthered the
states' function as 'laboratories for experimentation' within our federal system."). For a
discussion of judicial enforcement of constitutionally based federalism principles as a
policy matter, see United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 583 (1995); Ann Althouse, Inside
the Federalism Cases: Concern About the Federal Courts, 574 ANNALS 132, 137 (2001);
supra notes 90-97, 106-10, 130-40 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 68-98 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 134-43 and accompanying text.
250. Kane, supra note 43; see also IRIS J. LAV & NICHOLAS JOHNSON, STATE BUDGET
DEFICITS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004 ARE HUGE AND GROWING 1-2 (Center on Budget and
Policy Priorities 2003) (projecting continued fiscal trouble across the country in fiscal year
2004), available at http://www.cbpp.org/12-23-02sfp.pdf.
251. See generally LAy, supra note 2 (arguing that federal aid is the best way to
alleviate the ongoing state fiscal crises).
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cuts and a Republican-controlled Congress and White House,52
makes a federal bail-out unlikely. North Carolina has used many of
its short-term fixes and still faces a projected deficit.253  Having
already identified many budget cuts that are less painful and used up
its reserve of one-time fixes,25 4 2003-04 promises to be another budget
full of particularly difficult decisions. Without the benefit of flexible
financing, it is hard to believe that short-term fixes with long-term
greater costs, scrapped valuable investments, and neglected new
responsibilities will not be prominent features of the budget. Like
many states across the nation, many disparate trends have converged
to create what is not merely a temporary fiscal crisis, but may well
turn into a more fundamental crisis in confidence in state
government's power to deal with modern policy problems. If states
are to advocate for more state and local control of policy issues and
for flexibility to innovate in the area of government services, they will
continue to undercut their own arguments by the crippling nature of
their financial capabilities. Gone are the days when state and local
governments financed their pursuits with the stable property tax and
policy objectives were limited in an agrarian society. North Carolina,
the case in point for this Comment, commands a budget of $14 billion,
a budget larger than that of Pakistan, the Philippines, or even
Kuwait. 5 Current political as well as federal judicial trends promote
the importance of governmental action at the state level. A
compelling case exists that the state constitution has not kept up with
the times and that North Carolina has an opportunity to take a
leadership position and strike an important new path towards
modernization of state government in the American system. As John
J. Parker, former Chief Judge of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
stated regarding the role of the state constitution:
The purpose of a state constitution is two-fold: (1) to protect
the rights of the individual from encroachment by the state; and
(2) to provide a framework of government for the state and its
subdivisions. It is not the function of a constitution to deal with
temporary conditions, but to lay down general principles of
government which must be observed amid changing conditions.
It follows, then, that a constitution should not contain elaborate
252. See Lawrence M. O'Rourke, Bush's Economic Advisors Quit, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 7, 2002, at Al.
253. Kane, supra note 43.
254. Id.
255. Rob Christensen, The Legislature, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 26,
2003, at 1AA.
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legislative provisions, but should lay down briefly and clearly
fundamental principles upon which government shall proceed,
leaving it to the people's representatives to apply these
principles through legislation to conditions as they arise. 6
The current North Carolina constitution, like that of many state
constitutions, erects an inflexible legislative provision about how to
finance and cope with trends in law, policy, and the economy. A
public reassessment of long-standing restrictions on state debt would
contribute greatly to the effectiveness of the modern state and its
fundamental place in the American system of federalism.
ROBERT WARD SHAW
256. Sanders, supra note 14, at 50.
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